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ABSTRACT 
In the three decades since the Islamic revolution overturned the Pahlavi regime and 
ushered in the Islamic Republic, the world has seen the effects, not of Shi’a Islamic 
philosophy constituted as government, but more accurately of the personal vision of 
Ayatollah Khomeini regarding the state.  While Khomeini promised the regime to be the 
embodiment of Islamic social justice, the reality was a failure to deliver a consistent 
philosophy of Islamic government that could survive after his death.  In no area was that 
more evident than the economy. 
The formation of the Islamic government in Iran offered the potential for one of 
the first modern examples of Islamic economic theory instituted on a national scale.  The 
ideology had been well thought out by some scholars, and was fully in keeping with the 
espoused ideas of equality and social justice of the revolution.  The implementation was 
never fulfilled, however, due to Khomeini’s lack of interest in economic theory writ 
large, the influence of left-leaning populist elements of the revolution and early Islamic 
government, and Khomeini’s creation of perennially deadlocked institutions of 
government.  As a result, Iran has followed the same path of poor economic development 
common to most hydrocarbon rentier states. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis seeks to answer the question: “Is the failure of economic development 
in Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution caused by an inherent failure of the ideology of 
Islamic economics, or is it a classical case of the usual failings of a hydrocarbon rentier 
state?”  Iran, as an Islamic Republic, potentially stood as a practical example of the 
implementation of Islamic economic theory and practices on a national scale.  Implicit 
within this question is the examination of specific economic development issues within 
Iran, and an analysis of both the potential effectiveness of the proposed solutions, as well 
as an examination of the ultimate barriers that hindered the success of those plans.  This 
thesis will measure economic development, in the case of Iran, in terms of the reduction 
of the direct participatory role of government in the economy, the enhancement of the 
private sector’s share of economic activity, and (most critically) the diversification of the 
economy from the hydrocarbon rentier state paradigm. 
Additionally, this thesis will examine the history of economic development in Iran 
following the 1979 Islamic Revolution and pay particular attention to the attempts at 
development reform following the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war.  This examination will 
lay the foundation for understanding the general challenges previous Iranian 
administrations faced in advancing economic development, and will serve as a baseline 
from which to measure the continuation—or lack thereof—of real reforms by the 
Ahmadinejad government. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Iran stands today at the nexus of most major political events within the wider 
Middle East.  Iran’s foreign policy, and military, cultural and economic activities 
influence Iraq and Afghanistan, the tension and conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, 
and overall security and politics in the Arabian Gulf.  Iran possesses a long and rich 
cultural legacy that predates Islam, and its status as the world’s only shi’a Islamic-
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governed nation is a unique model for the confluence of religion and politics.  The 
significance of this is that success or failure of economic development in Iran has serious 
implications, not just for the living conditions of Iranians, but for the United States’ 
foreign policy in the Middle East.  
Following the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the Iranian government took a greater 
participatory role in the economy through the nationalization of most industries.  
Critically, the Islamic nature of the revolution and the government that followed meant 
that all aspects of Iran were modeled on Islamic theory and ideology, including the 
economy.  Thus, Iran potentially serves as a unique model of a comprehensive Islamic 
economic system.  However, Iran also possesses 10% of the world’s oil reserves (third 
largest) and has built its economy almost solely around this commodity.1  As a result, 
Iran traditionally has relied on hydrocarbon rents to form the great majority of its 
economic prosperity and to fund its social services.  It is, unfortunately, common for 
nations with similar natural endowments to fail to use these resources to develop their 
economy fully, at the expense of providing public entitlements in the short term. 
An examination of nature of the relative failures of 30 years of economic 
development planning in Iran would provide valuable insight into the potential of Islamic 
economic theory as a viable model for an economy.  If Iran’s development failures result 
from inherent problems within Islamic economic ideology—tenets and conditions that 
cannot be reconciled with policies that would expand the diversity, share, and prosperity 
of the private economic sector—then that insight is valuable for many governments 
debating the role of Islamic economics in their nations.  If, however, the failures are those 
traditional of rentier states, then not only would Islamic economic theory remain a viable 
alternative for some, it would also highlight the inadequacies of the Iranian regime’s 
implementation of a fully Islamic state.  
                                                 
1 CIA World Fact Book estimate, 1 January 2010. 
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C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
Often a point of contention with regard to Islamic economics is whether it is 
capable of integrating with the traditional, secular, model of international economics.  
Detractors believe that Islamic economic theory is not comprehensive or sophisticated 
enough to be anything more than a niche in international economic systems.  The 
prohibition with dealing in certain financial and economic activities—such as the receipt 
or paying of interest or dealing with pork products—due to their haram (forbidden) status 
in the Qur’an and sayings of the Prophet (Hadith) is further evidence, critics say, of the 
incompatibility of Islamic economics with a modern economy. 
While an extensive amount of literature exists regarding economics and 
development in Iran under the Shah, that volume of research dedicated to the economic 
development practices under the Islamic Republic lessens throughout time.  Today the 
literature regarding the contemporary economic structure is smaller, and much of it is 
focused on the political aspects of the economy: penetration of the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard Corps (IRGC) into the private sector and the economic effects of international 
sanctions on the Iranian economy are popular topics for study.   
There is little specific analysis of the ideological underpinnings of the regime’s 
economic behavior.  As an Islamic state, Iran is theoretically bound by the tenets of 
Islamic economic and finance theory.  Preliminary research shows that economic 
development is no better (and is, in some respects, much worse) than it was under the 
Shah’s regime.  Some opponents to the theological regime believe that there are inherent 
constrictions on broad economic development inherent to an adherence to Islamic 
economic theory.  Could Iran be an example of this? 
Again, preliminary research indicates that the fault for Iran’s poor economic 
development over the years has less to do with any failure of Islamic economic theory, 
but arises from familiar failings of other hydrocarbon rentier states.  The ideology of the 




failed policies of poor central economic planning, over-involvement of the government in 
the private sector, and misuse of the investment opportunity provided by hydrocarbon 
windfall revenue. 
This thesis will fill the void in analysis of the Islamic philosophical economic 
ideology in Iran and the role it has (or has not) played in developing the economy.  Iran 
today faces many of the challenges present across the spectrum of Middle East nations—
a demographic explosion, public entitlements that claim exorbitant shares of government 
revenue, poor private sector development, lack of infrastructure investment, and an over-
reliance on oil and gas rents.  This thesis will examine these failings in light of the 
government’s stated ideology to reveal that, in fact, Iran’s economic failures are not 
unique, and are unrelated to any inherent problem in Islamic economic theory. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is relatively little widely-read academic literature that addresses the specific 
application of Islamic economic theory in Iran and its relative impacts on macroeconomic 
performance—that is one of the main reasons for this thesis.  As a consequence, this 
thesis will examine two broader areas of study and analysis: Islamic economic theory and 
Iranian economic analysis.  After investigating the issues present in these two areas of 
research, this thesis will then use this knowledge to formulate independent conclusions 
regarding the effects of Islamic economic theory in Iran and further examine the root 
causes of Iran’s economic underperformance. 
Regarding the first area of study, Islamic economic theory, one must be aware 
that there are two distinct foci in the field.  The first is the historical foundations (which 
are relatively recent) and the theoretical paradigms of the ideology itself.   The second 
area concentrates on the determination of whether the differences between Islamic and 
what we will call “standard” capitalist economics are more than superficial, and if the 
Islamic economic system is complete enough to support an entire economy.  
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The driving force behind the modern development of a unique system labeled 
“Islamic finance” was the wealth created by the oil boom of the early and mid-1970s.2  
This boom created large amounts of capital in the Middle East (and, more specifically, 
the Gulf) that also coincided with an increase in Islamic fundamentalism throughout the 
region.  Consequently, there was a desire on the part of Muslims that the rewards of the 
natural gifts, that in their view Allah has favored their lands, should be handled in 
accordance with traditional Islamic views on money dictated in shari’a. 
The notion most generally associated with Islamic economics is the issue of the 
prohibition of interest.  But, in reality, “the main juritic issues… [are] Riba and interest, 
gambling and speculation, transactions involving gharar (chance and uncertainty), 
forward sales, foreign exchange transactions and transactions in debt.”3  The specific text 
of the Qur’an that prohibits riba, mostly defined as usury, is exemplified in Al-Baqarah: 
130, “O ye who believe, do not consume riba with continued redoubling and protect 
yourselves from God, perchance you may be blissful.”4  Superficially interpreting the text 
poses a problem: riba, in the pre-Islamic period, was a specific type of interest, where the 
amount the borrower owed doubled if he was late repaying, and if he was late again, it 
redoubled.5  Some people view riba as the prohibition of a specific type, rather than an 
outright ban on all interest.  That, however, is not the prevailing view among the scholars 
and theologians in contemporary Islam. 
The majority of influential Islamic authorities hold that all interest is usury and 
thus illegal under shari’a.  Iqbal and Mirakhor summarize thusly: 
Riba technically refers to the “premium” that must be paid by the 
borrower to the lender along with the principle amount as a condition of 
the loan or for an extension in the duration of the loan.  At least four 
                                                 
2 Timur Kuran, Islam and Mammon, the Economic Predicaments of Islamism (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), xiii.   
3 Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, Issues in Islamic Banking  (Leicester, UK: The Islamic Foundation, 
2004), 15. 
4 Saiful Azhar Rosely, Critical Issues on Islamic Banking and Financial Markets  (Bloomington, IN: 
Authorhouse, 2005), 34.  Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor, An Introduction to Islamic Finance; Theory 
and Practice  (Singapore: John Wiley and Sons, 2007), 58, also list the Qur’anic verses 3:130, 2:275–81, 
3:130–2, 4:161 and 30:39 as substantiating the prohibition against all interest. 
5 Rosely, Critical Issues, 34.  
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characteristics define the prohibited interest rate: (1) it is positive and 
fixed ex-ante [before the event]; (2) it is tied to the time period and the 
amount of the loan; (3) its payment is guaranteed regardless of the 
outcome of the purposes for which the principle was borrowed; and (4) the 
state apparatus sanctions and enforces its collection.6 
The interpretation that all interest is prohibited is substantiated in the core values 
of Islam, namely justice and equity.7  Riba was a source of much civic strife in the pre-
Islamic period on the Arabian Peninsula.  Egregious usury often led to slavery when the 
debtor could not pay back the ever-increasing loan.  Similarly, it seemed inequitable that 
only one party should be held at risk if the venture for which the loan was made was 
unsuccessful.  Thus, riba is viewed as the rich taking advantage of the poor and Qur’anic 
verses prohibiting riba are often followed with admonitions toward charity.8 
Surprisingly, the concept of a unique Islamic economic system was not a subject 
that concerned early Muslim thinkers, even during the heyday of medieval Islamic 
philosophy.9  Rather, it is a recent invention that has a more than coincidental theological 
similarity with the broader Islamist movement. As Western colonialism in the late 19th 
century (C.E.) brought its own style of finance, stirrings of discontent occurred.  A point 
of contention emerged with regard to the idea of interest, specifically when Barclay’s 
Bank established an operation in Egypt.10  Similar critiques materialized in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries (C.E.) within Muslim populations in the Indian sub-continent.  
But it took the rise of Islamism, and the desire for a wholly Islamic society, to create a 
financial architecture that could support the intellectual argument for an Islamic state. 
The idea of an economic system unique to Islam was born in the mid-20th century 
(C.E.) by one of the founders of the modern Islamist movement, Sayyid Abul-Ala 
                                                 
6 Iqbal and Mirakhor, An Introduction to Islamic Finance,  56. 
7 Rosley, Critical Issues, 33. 
8 Kuran, Islam and Mammon, 14. 
9 Kuran, Islam and Mammon, 2. 
10 Iqbal and Mirakhor, An Introduction to Islamic Finance, 23. 
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Mawdudi.11  Mawdudi, founder of Jama’at-i Islami in India and Pakistan, became 
convinced that the only path to a better life for all Muslims was to embrace Islam as the 
model for personal and societal life.  Unlike other early Islamists, Mawdudi had a more 
thoroughly cogitated idea of the ultimate state of a true Islamic society.12  As Kimur 
states, “for Mawdudi Islamic economics was primarily a vehicle for reasserting the 
primacy of Islam and secondarily an instrument for radical economic change.”13  This 
prioritization of the roles of Islamic economics is the same in many different Islamist 
movements, such as Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s comments refuting the idea that the 
Iranian revolution had an economic motivation.  To the Islamist, it is not about the price 
of watermelons.14 
The motivations that led to the rise of Islamism in general also affected the 
growth of Islamic economics.  As Islamism gained following, so did the idea of Islamic 
economics.  By 1963, the popular desire for a shari’a-compliant bank led to the founding 
of what is generally regarded as the first Islamic bank, the Mit Ghamr Local Savings 
Bank, by Islamic activist Ahmad al-Najjar in Egypt.15  While the bank itself only lasted 
four years, it was the vanguard of a larger movement.  More banks emerged with the goal 
of shari’a compliance or Islamic values, such as Pilgrims Savings Corporation in 1963 in 
Malaysia.  Their primary goal was to provide Muslims a place to save money for the hajj 
that would be free from the “contamination” of interest found in Western banks.16  The 
notion of Islamic banking gathered strength along with broader Islamism.  As a tentative 
rapprochement began between governments and Islamists, so too did the emergence of 
                                                 
11 Iqbal and Mirakhor, An Introduction to Islamic Finance, 2.  Iqbal and Mirakhor also credit 
Mawdudi, but also include Imam Muhammad Baqir al–Sadr in Iraq, Anwar Iqbal Qureshi in Pakistan, 
Mohammad Nejatullah Siddiqi in India, Muhammad Uzair and Umer Chapra in Saudi Arabia, and Ahmad 
al–Najjar in Egypt as early intellectuals who realized the need for a unique economic system.  But most 
scholars point to Mawdudi as the earliest and most articulate presentation. 
12 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “Mawdudi and the Jama’at–i Islami: The Origins, Theory and Practice of 
Islamic Revivalism,” in Pioneers of Islamic Revival, ed. Ali Rahnama (London, UK: Zed Books Ltd., 
1994), 101. 
13 Kuran, Islam and Mammon, 5. 
14 Kuran, Islam and Mammon, 6. 
15 Iqbal and  Mirakhor, Introduction to Islamic Finance, 24.   
16 Iqbal and  Mirakhor, Introduction to Islamic Finance, 24. 
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state sponsorship of Islamic banking.  The Nasir Social Bank, established in 1971 in 
Egypt by a Presidential decree, is the first example of a totally interest-free banking 
institution.17 
The earliest examples of Islamic banking with real economic significance 
occurred in the mid-1970s, following the first great oil boom, as private Islamic banking 
emerged.  Starting in 1975, with the Dubai Islamic Bank, many more institutions 
followed to provide a shari’a-compliant home for the growing amount of petro-dollars 
held by Muslims in the Middle East.  Then, in 1976, the First International Conference on 
Islamic Economics took place in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.18  These steps were mostly 
unnoticed until the 1980s, when Islamic economics became “mainstream” and the Islamic 
Republics of Iran, Pakistan and Sudan announced their intentions to transform their entire 
financial systems to make them shari’a-compliant.19  Historically, Islamic economics and 
Islamic banking has grown and expanded in popularity in conjunction with the cycles of 
the oil market.  The oil boom times have seen the sector’s expansion as an influx of 
liquidity into the Middle East permits Muslims the economic freedom to venture into new 
realms of banking and finance.  
Regarding the second broad area of literature necessary for this thesis, Iran 
provides an excellent case study of Islamic economic ideology as it is one of a scant few 
nations in the world that purport to be, not just an Islamic political system, but to have all 
aspects of the social, political, and economic sectors in full adherence to Islamic 
philosophy.   
Central economic planning was the method favored by the Iranian government for 
30 years before the revolution and originated in the wake of the systems developed in the 
Soviet Union, China, and India.  Unlike these countries, Iran’s was not a comprehensive 
input-output based plan; rather, it issued expressions of official intent with regard to the 
distribution of oil-export revenue among public investment projects.20  At the time, Iran’s 
                                                 
17 Iqbal and  Mirakhor, Introduction to Islamic Finance, 24. 
18 Iqbal and  Mirakhor, Introduction to Islamic Finance, 24–25. 
19 Iqbal and  Mirakhor, Introduction to Islamic Finance, 25. 
20 Jahangir Amuzegar,  “Iran’s Post–Revolutionary Planning: The Second Try,” Middle East Policy 
III:1, (March 2001):  25–26. 
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“technocratic” approach to economic development (increasing output by encouraging 
either the adoption of improved technology or by increasing greater incorporation of 
conventional inputs, such as capital) seemed in line with the country’s stated “liberal 
capitalist ideology.”21 
In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, the idea of central economic 
planning was maintained largely because of the influence, at the time, of Islamist 
Marxists and “left-leaning populist clergy.”22  To complicate the process, however, the 
Khomeini regime also added social and cultural aspects to the existing economic 
planning process.  Khomeini’s notions of velat-i faqih (sovereignty of the jurist) meant 
that he, and the Supreme Leaders who would follow him, must have governance over all 
aspects—cultural, religious, social, and economic—of the umma.  Thus, the ideas of 
economic development are subordinated to the interests of the social development of the 
state. This made what had been a difficult task under the Shah’s anemic administrative 
capacity nearly impossible in the post-revolution Islamic state. 
Further complicating the task of developing the Iranian economy after the 1979 
revolution was the war with Iraq that began in 1980 and consumed a majority of the 
military, political, social, and economic resources of the country for the following 
decade.  The Iran-Iraq War prevented the type of centralized economic planning that had 
characterized the Pahlavi state.23  Two reasons for this likely exist.  The first, and most 
obvious, reason is that the war was an economic catastrophe for Iran.  The effects of the 
war on the Iranian economy will be examined in greater detail subsequently, but for now 
it is sufficient to say that the constant and severe tax on Iran’s resources of blood and 
treasure limited it to ad hoc economic policy rather than well thought out development 
strategy.   
                                                 
21 Robert E. Looney, Economic Origins of the Iranian Revolution (New York: Pergamon Policy 
Studies Press, 1982): 258. 
22 Jahangir Amuzegar, “Iran’s Post–Revolutionary Planning,” 26. 
23 Anonymous,“Iran.” Oxford Economic Country Briefings: Iran (19 August 2009): 1–5. 
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed 9 March 9 2010) 
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The second reason for the hiatus of central economic planning was its lack of 
appeal to Ayatollah Khomeini, the Islamic Revolution’s literal and spiritual leader.  The 
man unconcerned with the price of watermelons was similarly unconcerned with the 
economic factors affecting the price of the watermelon in the first place.  Evidence 
supporting this is found in the elevation of economic issues to a place of primacy in the 
regimes that followed Khomeini.24  This was a subtle, though tacit, rebuke of that part of 
the Supreme Leader’s guidance.  Sound economic planning, however, took a seat behind 
political ideology with the arrival of the Iran-Iraq war, which followed soon after the 
Islamic Revolution. 
It is difficult to emphasize the severity and rapidity with which the Iran-Iraq war 
wrecked the Iranian economy.  By the end of 1981, foreign exchange reserves fell from 
$14.6 billion at the end of the Pahlavi regime, to $1 billion at the close of 1981.  While 
the government initially relied on oil production to sustain the economy, the increases of 
1982 and ’83 (to $19 billion from $12 billion in 1981) were not sustainable.  By 1984 and 
’85, revenues were back at $12–13 billion and continued to fall ($6.6 billion in 1986).  
The consequential 50% unemployment by 1987 resulted in the government creating 
schemes to mobilize labor (specifically in the agricultural sector) by exempting members 
of “The Reconstruction Campaign” from military service and sending them instead to 
rural areas. Additionally, the government sought to ration precious foreign currency by 
limiting imports of “non-essential” products.25  
Following the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war, the imminent need to restore the 
nation to a functioning economic foundation was obvious.  Precipitous to this was the 
death of Khomeini in 1989, which allowed more economically progressive personalities 
to influence the country’s policies.  It is from this point that the Iranian government is 
most able to exert independent control of the economy, guided by the economic 
principles of their choosing. 
                                                 
24Jahangir Amuzegar,  “Iran’s Post–Revolutionary Planning,” 26. 
25 Efraim Karsh, The Iran–Iraq War: 1980–1988  (New York: Osprey Publishing, Ltd.,  2002):  74–
75. 
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E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
To adequately understand the theological basis and modern economic instruments 
of Islamic economics, this paper will use a broad range of sources including scholarly 
books and journal articles, information from organizations involved in the global 
financial system (such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund), 
contemporary news publications centered on politics and economics (such as The 
Economist and Financial Times) and, critically, financial data directly obtained from the 
significant actors in global Islamic finance (such as Islamic banking arms of the major 
banks, such as HSBC). 
This paper will be a case study on the Iranian economy and will use historical 
narrative based on macroeconomic data to examine the economic development plans of 
the various Iranian administrations and assess the actual role of Islamic economic thought 
in those plans. Economic development data will come from the Iranian government, 
international economic institutions (World Bank, IMF, WTO), and economic 
publications, as well as scholarly work, on economic development in general and Iran in 
particular.  To enable this, this paper will analyze the costs and benefits of Iranian 
economic development schemes and identify economic development theories used by the 
Iranian government.  Further, this paper will assess the overall effectiveness of the 
applied development theories and identify which factors contributed to (or hindered) this 
effectiveness.  By doing so, this paper will highlight the role of politics and religion 
within the Iranian economic system and identify barriers to further economic 
development. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will be organized into five chapters, representing an introduction 
chapter, three analytic/research chapters, and conclusion chapter.  An overview of chapter 
organization is as follows: 
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Chapter I provides an introduction to the topic, states the research question 
addressed, its overall importance to the field of study, the methods and sources employed, 
and a review of the relevant literature on the topic.   
Chapter II investigates Islamic economic theory, its historical origins, the general 
principles by which it is used in a modern economic system, and points of potential 
conflict or difficulty that arise in comparison with “Western” secular capitalism.   
Chapter III examines the economy of Iran following the revolution against the 
Shah and replacement by the Islamic Republic.  Specifically, this chapter looks at the 
economic and other relevant (and unique) aspects of the Islamic Republic’s ideology, as 
articulated by its founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and as successive leaders have 
implemented that religious economic ideology.   
Chapter IV uses the foundations established in Chapters II and III to analyze 
specific macroeconomic programs in Iran and the associated economic performance in 
the first 30 years of the Islamic Republic.  This chapter identifies the key elements of 
Islamic economic theory purportedly used in Iranian macroeconomic policy, and 
determines if they have, in fact, been implemented in practice. Further, Chapter IV 
analyzes the structural and political/policy factors responsible for Iran’s economic 
successes and failures.   
Chapter V is the conclusion, detailing succinctly the findings of this thesis and 
highlighting policy implications and issues for further research.  
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II. “WESTERN” AND ISLAMIC ECONOMIC THEORY 
A. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THEORY 
To understand the specific performance of the post-revolution Iranian economy and 
highlight the selection and execution of economic development of Iran’s economy, one must 
understand the basic theory of economic development as it is defined in the Western 
capitalist model and be able to compare this to Islamic economic theory.  Through this, one 
can create an appreciable measure of Iran’s economic successes and failures.  That is, Iran’s 
economic conditions must be appraised by the intended and unintended consequences of the 
government’s economic planning and execution under its own philosophical tenets.  In other 
words, one must measure Iran’s economic successes, failures, and methods against goals and 
methods that are philosophically compatible with Islam. 
In general “economic development,” as it is understood in Western capitalist 
systems, is also transferable to Islamic systems as well.  The overall goal of an expansive 
and diverse private-sector economy operating within a legal framework provided by 
limited governmental regulation is common to both paradigms.  The distinction between 
simple growth of the economy—that is, the overall increase in the size of the economy as 
measured by increasing GDP over time—and economic development is important in 
assessing a country’s economic health.  If economic development is to be understood as 
distinct from economic growth, then it is clear that Iran has been largely unsuccessful 
with regard to development.  To define development, this paper will use Perkins, Radelet 
and Lindauer: 
Economic development implies more, particularly improvements in 
health, education, and other aspects of human welfare.… If all of the 
increased income is concentrated in the hands of a few rich elite or spent 
on monuments or military apparatus, there has been very little 
development…26 
                                                 
26 Dwight H. Perkins, Steven Radelet, and  David L. Lindauer, Economics of Development, 6th Ed.  
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006): 12. 
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Thus, it is not simple expansion of GDP that we understand as development but a 
range of improvements to the industrial, economic, and social structure of the nation.  As 
the Michael Spence’s 2007 report indicates, economic growth should be an agent of 
economic development in order to improve a society.27 
Additionally, Perkins et al. state three specific reasons why economic 
development cannot be assumed as a natural outcome of growth.  First, they state, 
economic growth is not shared among the population but instead is concentrated in 
people and institutions that augment the “power and glory of the state and its rulers.”  
Secondly, consumption increases are delayed (often perpetually) in favor of heavy 
investment of resources in the present time.  Third, rise in GDP does not result in an 
increase in overall standard of living for the majority, but causes a growth in wealth 
disparity as the wealthy increase their share of GDP relative to the rest of the 
population.28   
It is clear that, from the beginning, the five-year economic development plans of 
the Islamic Revolutionary Government accepted the idea that structural reforms were 
necessary for the country’s economic well-being; particularly in the aftermath of the war 
with Iraq and the loss of domestic industrial production.   While figuratively a centrally 
planned economy, the First Development Plan set the themes of market-oriented 
structural reforms focusing on expanding privatization of the economy, reducing the 
direct participatory role of the government, deregulation and liberalization that are found 
in all subsequent plans.29  These themes were appropriate for Iran’s economic situation 
following the war with Iraq, and these structural reforms were successful to the extent 
they were implemented.  This success was only relative, however, since the economy 
grew and developed in comparison with the abysmal showing during the eight years of 
war, but failed to establish long-lasting reforms to the structure. 
                                                 
27 Michael Spence, “The Growth Report: Principle Findings and Recommendations,” Spence 
Commission on Growth and Development (London, May 2008). 
28 Perkins et. al., Economics of Development, 39–40. 
29 Amuzegar,  “Iran’s Post–Revolutionary Planning,” 26. 
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B. THE ORIGINS OF ISLAMIC ECONOMICS 
The notion most generally associated with Islamic economics is the issue of the 
prohibition of interest.  But in reality, “the main juritic issues… [are] Riba and interest, 
gambling and speculation, transactions involving gharar (chance and uncertainty), 
forward sales, foreign exchange transactions and transactions in debt.”30  The specific 
text of the Qur’an prohibits riba mostly defined as usury, in Al-Baqarah: 130, “O ye who 
believe, do not consume riba with continued redoubling and protect yourselves from 
God, perchance you may be blissful.”31  Superficially interpreting the text poses a 
problem: riba, in the pre-Islamic period, was a specific type of interest, where the amount 
the borrower owed doubled if he was late repaying, and if he was late again, it 
redoubled.32  Some people view riba as the prohibition of a specific type, rather than an 
outright ban on all interest.  That, however, is not the prevailing view among the scholars 
and theologians in contemporary Islam. 
The majority of influential Islamic authorities hold that all interest is usury and 
thus illegal under shari’a.  Iqbal and Mirakhor summarize thusly: 
Riba technically refers to the “premium” that must be paid by the 
borrower to the lender along with the principle amount as a condition of 
the loan or for an extension in the duration of the loan.  At least four 
characteristics define the prohibited interest rate: (1) it is positive and 
fixed ex-ante [before the event]; (2) it is tied to the time period and the 
amount of the loan; (3) its payment is guaranteed regardless of the 
outcome of the purposes for which the principle was borrowed; and (4) the 
state apparatus sanctions and enforces its collection.33 
The interpretation that all interest is prohibited is substantiated in the core values 
of Islam, namely justice and equity.34  Riba was a source of much civic strife in the pre-
                                                 
30 Siddiqi, Issues in Islamic Banking, 15. 
31 Rosely, Critical, 34. Iqbal and Mirakhor, An Introduction to Islamic Finance, 58, also list the 
Qur’anic verses 3:130, 2:275–81, 3:130–2, 4:161 and 30:39 as substantiating the prohibition against all 
interest. 
32 Rosely, Critical Issues, 34. 
33 Iqbal and Mirakhor,  An Introduction to Islamic Finance,  56. 
34 Rosley, Critical Issues, 33. 
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Islamic period on the Arabian Peninsula.  Egregious usury often led to slavery when the 
debtor could not pay back the ever-increasing loan.  Similarly, it seemed inequitable that 
only one party should be held at risk if the venture for which the loan was made was 
unsuccessful.  Thus, riba is viewed as the rich taking advantage of the poor and Qur’anic 
verses prohibiting riba are often followed with admonitions toward charity.35 
Surprisingly, the concept of a unique Islamic economic system was not a subject 
that concerned early Muslim thinkers, even during the heyday of medieval Islamic 
philosophy.36 Rather it is a recent invention that has more than a coincidental theological 
similarity with the broader Islamist movement. As Western colonialism in the late 19th 
century (C.E.) brought its own style of finance, stirrings of discontent occurred.  A point 
of contention emerged with regard to the idea of interest, specifically when Barclay’s 
Bank established an operation in Egypt.37  Similar critiques materialized in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries (C.E.) within Muslim populations in the Indian sub-continent.  
But it took the rise of Islamism, and the desire for a wholly Islamic society, to create a 
financial architecture that could support the intellectual argument for an Islamic state. 
The idea of an economic system unique to Islam was born in the mid-20th century 
(C.E.) by one of the founders of the modern Islamist movement, Sayyid Abul-Ala 
Mawdudi.38  Mawdudi, founder of Jama’at-i Islami in India and Pakistan, became 
convinced that the only path to a better life for all Muslims was to embrace Islam as the 
model for personal and societal life.  Unlike other early Islamists, Mawdudi had a more 
thoroughly cogitated idea of the ultimate state of a true Islamic society.39  As Kimur 
states, “for Mawdudi Islamic economics was primarily a vehicle for reasserting the 
                                                 
35 Kuran, Islam and Mammon, 14. 
36 Kuran, Islam and Mammon, 2. 
37 Iqbal and Mirakhor, An Introduction to Islamic Finance, 23. 
38 Ibid. 2.  Iqbal and Mirakhor also credit Mawdudi, but also include Imam Muhammad Baqir al–Sadr 
in Iraq, Anwar Iqbal Qureshi in Pakistan, Mohammad Nejatullah Siddiqi in India, Muhammad Uzair and 
Umer Chapra in Saudi Arabia, and Ahmad al–Najjar in Egypt as early intellectuals who realized the need 
for a unique economic system.  But mist scholars point to Mawdudi as the earliest and most articulate 
presentation. 
39 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “Mawdudi and the Jama’at–i Islami: The Origins, Theory and Practice of 
Islamic Revivalism.”  101. 
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primacy of Islam and secondarily an instrument for radical economic change.”40  This 
prioritization of the roles of Islamic economics is the same in many different Islamist 
movements, such as Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s comments refuting the idea that the 
Iranian revolution had an economic motivation.  To the Islamist, it is not about the price 
of watermelons.41 
The motivations that led to the rise of Islamism in general also affected the 
growth of Islamic economics.  As Islamism gained following, so did the idea of Islamic 
economics.  By 1963, the popular desire for a shari’a-compliant bank led to the founding 
of what is generally regarded as the first Islamic bank: the Mit Ghamr Local Savings 
Bank by Islamic activist Ahmad al-Najjar in Egypt.42  While the bank itself only lasted 
four years, it was the vanguard of a larger movement.  More banks emerged with the goal 
of shari’a compliance or Islamic values, such as Pilgrims Savings Corporation in 1963 in 
Malaysia.  Their primary goal was to provide Muslims a place to save money for the hajj 
that would be free from the “contamination” of interest found in Western banks.43  The 
notion of Islamic banking gathered strength along with broader Islamism.  As a tentative 
rapprochement began between governments and Islamists, so too did the emergence of 
state sponsorship of Islamic banking.  The Nasir Social Bank, established in 1971 in 
Egypt by a Presidential decree, is the first example of a totally interest-free banking 
institution.44 
The earliest examples of Islamic banking with real economic significance 
occurred in the mid-1970s, following the first great oil boom, as private Islamic banking 
emerged.  Starting with the Dubai Islamic Bank in 1975, many more institutions followed 
to provide a shari’a-compliant home for the growing amount of petro-dollars held by 
Muslims in the Middle East.  Then, in 1976, the First International Conference on Islamic 
                                                 
40 Kuran, Islam and Mammon, 5. 
41 Kuran, Islam and Mammon, 6. 
42 Iqbal and Mirakhor, Introduction to Islamic Finance, 24.   
43 Iqbal and Mirakhor, Introduction to Islamic Finance, 24. 
44 Iqbal and Mirakhor, Introduction to Islamic Finance, 24. 
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Economics took place in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.45  These steps were mostly unnoticed 
until the 1980s, when Islamic economics became “mainstream” and the Islamic 
Republics of Iran, Pakistan and Sudan announced their intentions to transform their entire 
financial systems to make them shari’a compliant.46  Historically, Islamic economics and 
Islamic banking has grown and expanded in popularity in conjunction with the cycles of 
the oil market.  The oil boom times have seen the sector’s expansion as an influx of 
liquidity into the Middle East permits Muslims the economic freedom to venture into new 
realms of banking and finance.   
Today, the global consequences of the “Great Recession” have brought Islamic 
economics to the fore as a potential competitor to traditional Western capitalism.  Up 
through the early fall of 2009, it appeared that the Islamic Financial sector had not only 
escaped the worst of the global financial crisis, but had performed reasonably well.  
Helping this was the fact that the industry has almost no exposure to the sub-prime loan 
industry (as the mechanisms of constructing shari’a-compliant home loans are 
difficult).47   The biggest impact to Islamic finance thus far has been a loss of liquidity 
flowing into the region as Western sources of cash have dried up.  Islamic banks also 
were not as highly leveraged as Western banks, so they had more ability to absorb losses 
without having to resort to government assistance.48  While the effect to the industry as a 
whole has not been as dramatic, certain segments, specifically sukuk (Islamic bonds), 
have very recently encountered trouble. 
All sukuk saw a dramatic reduction in investment in 2008–2009.  Issues of sukuk 
in 2008, globally, fell by more than half of 2007 amounts (to approximately 
$20 billion).49  This is a natural outcome of the global situation as investors are less likely 
to invest in debt issues in uncertain financial times due to the risk of loss.  The outlook 
for the sukuk industry potentially changed on November 25, 2009, when, late in the day 
                                                 
45 Iqbal and Mirakhor,  Introduction to Islamic Finance, 24–25. 
46 Iqbal and Mirakhor,  Introduction to Islamic Finance, 25. 
47 Andrew Wood, “Islamic finance escapes worst of the crisis,” Financial Times (7 June 2009). 
48 Wood, “Islamic finance.” 
49 Wood, “Islamic finance.” 
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before the Eid al-Adha holiday, Dubai World announced its intentions to suspend 
payments of $59 billion worth of debt for at least 6 months.  This includes a $3.5 billion 
sukuk that was due for payment December 14 of 2009.50 
C. ISLAMIC ECONOMICS AND FINANCE: CURRENT PRACTICES AND 
ISSUES 
1. The Public Sector: Financing the Government 
Islamic economics presents unique challenges, both for public and private sector 
finance.  The most significant concern in designing a shari’a-compliant financial system 
is the issue of interest.  Specifically, the idea of risk-free investment with a rate of return 
determined ex-ante is problematic because this is how both governments and banks 
function in the modern, globalized world.51  Shari’a prohibits a government’s 
conventionally issued bond, for example, as it predetermines the rate of return and that 
return is guaranteed.  Even when bonds are raised for a specific purpose (e.g., the city of 
Los Angeles wants to issue a bond to build a bridge), there is no linkage between the 
performance of the activity the bond was created to fund, and its potential return.  The 
bond is guaranteed, and the borrower assumes all the risk; this is fundamentally counter 
to Islamic notions of fairness and equity.  Similarly, private sector banking also faces 
issues with inherent noncompliance with shari’a.  Modern, or “Western,” banking relies 
heavily on both the issuance and receipt of interest. 
The public sector solutions generally conceived involve the bifurcation of 
government projects into two classes: asset creating and non-asset creating.52  Those 
projects that are asset creating could conceivably be financed through traditional market 
economics, where the government would, like a business, issue a call for investment in a 
particular project.  Those choosing to participate would be able to purchase an equity 
                                                 
50 Roula Khalaf, Simon Kerr, and Andrew England, “Stopped in its tracks,” Financial Times– Analysis  
(2 December 2009). 
51 Nadeem Ul Haq and Abbas Mirakhor, “The Design of Instruments for Government Finance in an 
Islamic Economy” (IMF Research Paper WP/98/54, 1998): 3. 
52 Ul–Haq and Mirakhor, “Government Finance,” 4–5. 
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stake (a share of the project, but not guaranteed return) that would either return a profit or 
a loss.  Essentially, this is like owning stock in a company: one owns an equity share in 
the company at a price the market determines based on known factors contributing to its 
value.  At the end of the year the company, providing it has done well, generates enough 
profit to cover its expenses and distributes the excess to its shareholders via dividends.  If 
the company underperforms, they payout no dividends, the price of the stock falls and the 
investor loses money. In an equity investment, there is no guaranteed return.  Therefore, 
in the earlier example where Los Angeles wants to build a bridge, the city would seek 
investors in the project, who would purchase a share in the actual construction of the 
bridge.  To be an asset, the bridge would have to have more than intrinsic value, and a 
likely scenario would see a toll collected.  The profitability of the bridge would then be 
easily determined. 
Non-asset generating government projects, however, require a different method of 
finance.  By definition, one cannot sell equity in something that is not an asset (as it has 
no real or, at least, easily quantifiable value); one example would be defense 
procurement.  Defense is a classic area that is solely consumptive (in asset terms), not 
productive.  While a nation arguably reaps some collective good from the expenditure, 
and old and obsolete defense equipment gets sold off to foreign nations occasionally, this 
does not change the fact that defense equipment costs money that is never recouped in 
kind.  In a nation that is operating fully on an Islamic economic (shari’a-compliant) 
model, the only way for the state to pay for non-asset creating endeavors is through 
taxation.53  This creates secondary issues: the Qur’an stipulates the taxation rate of 
Muslims in an Islamic state (zakat).  Zakat has several unique factors, especially with 
regard to government finances.  First, zakat are “levied and calculated on actual taxable 
items… in-kind taxes.”  The taxes may be paid, however, in in-kind or equivalent 
value.54  Therefore, a farmer could conceivably pay his taxes in corn, if that was his 
product. Complicating matters is the fact that the taxation rate is calculated by specific 
                                                 
53 Ul–Haq and Mirakhor, “Government Finance,” 4–6. 
54Ali Reza Jalili, “A Descriptive Overview of Islamic Taxation,” Journal of American Academy of 
Business, Cambridge (March 2006): 19. 
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item, not merely categorically.  For example, there is a tax on lentils but not apricots.55  
Further complication to the taxation issue includes shari’a restrictions and compulsions 
on what taxes from the public treasury may be spent on.  The implications of the ideas of 
zakat and equity financing of public projects are that a fully Islamic government 
economic system would finance a true “public sector.”   
The complexity and potential issues of enforcement are likely reasons why there 
are few fully Islamic economies in any nation.  While some, such as the Islamic 
Republics of Iran and Pakistan, have stated their desire and intentions to transition to 
fully shari’a-compliant public financial sectors, none of their systems hold up as fully 
compliant under independent scrutiny.  Iran, for example, has issued a ruling that fixed-
rate interest charging between government institutions is permissible (presumably 
because no “individuals” are involved, and consequently no individual could be harmed 
by riba).56  Not only does this illustrate the difficulties of operating a modern nation-state 
under Islamic economics, it also highlights the most significant point of contention for 
critics of the system: that Islamic economics manages most of the issues of shari’a 
prohibited practices by renaming them.  This will be discussed more thoroughly in the 
following section on private sector finance. 
2. The Private Sector: Islamic Finance 
Private sector finance also faces challenges under an Islamic economic system; 
once again, the point of contention is riba.  It would seem intuitively impossible for a 
bank to function under rules prohibiting the very method by which banks make a 
substantial portion of their income.  The rapid growth of worldwide Islamic banking, 
however, would seem to prove this assumption incorrect.  In 2009, the Islamic banking 
industry possessed shari’a-compliant assets valued at over $822 billion, a 28.6% growth 
from the previous year.  Accordingly, the expectation is for Islamic finance as an industry 
                                                 
55 Jalili, “Islamic Taxation,” 19. 
56 Kuran, Islam and Mammon, 15. 
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to total $1.03 trillion by 2010.57  Indeed, emerging and developing economies have seen 
the fastest growth in Islamic finance over the past few years while an increasing number 
of banks in developed countries have opened Islamic “windows.”58  
A window, in financial terms, is a part of the bank that, while created from the 
greater corporation, is wholly self-contained.  This is important when it comes to issues 
such as shari’a compliance.  HSBC Amanah, for example, the Islamic banking window 
for the Hong Kong Shanghi Banking Corporation (British by tradition, and one of the 
world’s largest banks) maintains that its connections to HSBC are tenuous enough that its 
board of shari’a scholars has declared HSBC Amanah to be untainted by the riba of the 
original company.  Through both established and emerging Islamic banks, shari’a-
compliant financing has grown rapidly in recent years and currently possesses significant 
financial credibility.  This success has been achieved, however, more through creative 
interpretations of standard banking practices than it has from a truly unique economic 
philosophy. 
Finance is the investment and return of money and comes in several variations.  
As stated in the earlier section on how Islamic economics impacts government financing, 
in the private sector, there are generally two (very basic) ways of making money through 
finance.  One is the purchase of an equity share (like stock; one owns an actual portion of 
the company and the company invests the money in increasing production, but returns a 
dividend only if there is profit).  The other is the purchase of a bond (basically a loan to a 
company, individual, or government, where risk is theoretically minimal and return on 
investment is guaranteed at a predetermined rate).  In general, Islam has no problem with 
equity financing if there is no Islamic compunction with the financed issue.59  Indeed, 
this method of financing, with it equal distribution of risk of loss and sharing of profit, 
                                                 
57 Financial Times and HSBC Amanah Bank, “The Top 500 Islamic Financial Institutions.”  The 
Banker, November 2009 Supplement, Financial Times Business, Ltd. (London, UK, 2009).  Received as 
advanced copy through personal communications with Corporate Communications Manager, HSBC 
Amanah, HSBC Bank Middle East Ltd., (4 November 2009):  3. 
58 Financial Times, “Top 500.” 
59 Iqbal and Mirakhor, Introduction to Islamic Finance, 77. 
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fits the moral compass of Islam well.  Where Islamic financing has had to be creative is 
in the area of loaning money and getting a return on investment that is shari’a-compliant. 
There are many diverse and unique methods of Islamic finance, but it is sufficient 
to concentrate one’s understanding on four basic types of finance used to work around the 
prohibition on riba: mudaraba, musharaka, murabahah, and ijara.60  The first two, 
mudaraba (a trustee financing contract, but also translated simply as a “partnership”) and 
musharaka (equity partnership), are profit and loss sharing arrangements that have been 
known since the beginning in Islam and have roots in classical Islamic jurisprudence.61  
Murabahah (cost-plus sales) and ijara (lease purchase) are more recent financing models.  
In fact, murabahah is the most popular financing model for Islamic banks.62  The 
following paragraphs will detail how these financial instruments work, and also reveal 
that they are generally recognizable to anyone familiar with some of the basics of 
“Western” finance. 
In financial terms, mudabara is when an investor, or group (i.e., a bank) 
“entrusts” capital to a person, usually for the purposes of starting or enhancing a business.  
The recipient, or trustee, of the money then puts it into production or trade and “returns… 
a prespecified share of the resulting profits along with the principle.”63  What profit is left 
is retained by the trustee as reward for time and labor.  What is critical in this relationship 
is the fact that the risk is borne by both parties; should the business fail, the “investor” 
will lose his principle and the trustee loses his labor.  This notion of shared risk is integral 
to Islam writ large, and Islamic economic theory specifically.  Musharaka is similar to 
mudabara, but with the distinction that the trustee adds some of his own capital to the 
venture.  This capital stands either to be lost or returned to the trustee, depending on the 
                                                 
60 Shirley Chiu and Robin Newberger.  “Islamic Finance: Meeting Financial Needs with Faith Based 
Products,” Profitwise News and Views–A Quarterly Magazine of the IMF (February 2006): 9.  Iqbal and 
Mirakhor,  Introduction to Islamic Finance, in chapter 3 do perhaps the most comprehensive listing of the 
various instruments of Islamic finance found in any one publication.  The limiting of this paper to the four 
principle instruments stated is because a) these are the four universally acknowledged methods of Islamic 
financing found in nearly all discussions on the topic; and b) because the other methods are either variants 
or modifications of those discussed here. 
61 Kuran, Islam and Mammon, 8. 
62 Kuran, Islam and Mammon, 10. 
63 Kuran, Islam and Mammon, 8. 
 24
performance of the company.   Musharaka combines the ideas of partnership and 
management, and is used in lieu of debt security, a forbidden concept in Islam.64 
These concepts of financing are in fact not unique to Islam.  Western finance has 
a similar concept to mudaraba and musharaka in venture capital.  Here, it is important to 
distinguish the general differences between a venture capitalist and a bank.  First, the 
venture capitalist bases investment decisions on the potential profitability of a specific 
idea, not the previous credit history of the borrower as a bank would. The venture 
capitalist is solely concerned with whether the idea is sound and potentially profitable, 
not what collateral the borrower may have.  Second, the venture capitalist takes a share of 
the profit, whereas a bank gets a guaranteed return in the form of interest.  Third, the 
venture capitalist has a much closer relationship to the investment enterprise, 
occasionally participating directly in the management of the process; unlike a bank whose 
relationship is a passive one with its investment.65  Understanding these differences is 
critical to evaluating the shari’a compliance of these financial methods. 
Murabahahs are designed to replicate conventional loans for the purchase of 
commodities.  The concept can best be explained by example: a bank lends money to an 
entrepreneur who needs to purchase raw material but lacks capital.  The financier and the 
borrower agree on a “mark-up” (profit margin) added to the cost of the product.  The 
repayment is delayed for a set period of time while the entrepreneur inputs the material 
into his final product and sells it.  Often, to avoid dealing with the hassle of actually 
taking possession of the commodity before reselling it to the entrepreneur, the bank will 
appoint the entrepreneur as their agent authorized to accept delivery and hold the 
merchandise (though the bank is still technically the owner).66  It is important to 
understand that murabaha is a contract on a sale, and comes with several restrictions.  
First, the transaction cannot be for financing purposes, such as working capital, payment 
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of wages, settling accounts, etc.  The financier must actually purchase a tangible item.  
Second, should the entrepreneur default (which, in Islamic finance, is non-payment of 
two consecutive payments), the financier only has legitimate claim to the value of the 
financed good, not the mark-up or any other price adjustments.67  While the mechanics 
above seem to be very similar to a conventional understanding of interest (the financier, 
after all, has no actual interest in the commodity and never takes real possession of it), it 
is critical to the shari’a interpretation that it is trade that is being conducted, because 
there is Qur’anic justification for trade and prohibition of riba.68  As Iqbal and Mirakhor 
state,  
The legal difference between murabaha and an interest based loan is 
clear—whereas the former is a sale contract in which the price is increased 
for deferment of payment, the latter is an increase in the amount of debt 
for deferment.  The first is permitted but the second is not.69 
This distinction is also important to understanding with regard to the fourth tool 
of Islamic finance, ijara.   
Ijara, or al-ijara ‘ain, in a sense combines financing and collateral as it is more 
like a lease, or hire-purchase (called ijara-wa-iktana).70  Like all forms of Islamic 
financing, ijara is a purchase contract.  In this case, however, what is purchased is not a 
tangible asset, but rather the right to use an object (usufruct) for a specified period.71  
This is similar to a conventional lease.  Just as when one leases a car, one does not own 
the car, but is paying for the privilege to drive it for specific period.  Where the hire-
purchase aspect of ijara comes in is when a bank, or other financier, purchases something 
on behalf of someone and then leases it back for a specific period.  Often, the end result is 
an ownership transfer of the asset at the end of the lease, and the amount paid comes out 
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to the cost of item plus profit for the financier.72  It is important also to understand that 
the ijara contract is for the utilization of something, not the consumption of it; thus, one 
condition of ijara is that the object cannot be perishable or consumable.73 
The last major instrument of the Islamic financial system is the sukuk, otherwise 
known as an Islamic bond.  While sukuk (the plural of sakk in Arabic, meaning 
certificate) has recognition in traditional Islamic jurisprudence, it is a recent innovation 
(the first was launched in 2001) and can be more easily understood as a type of 
proportional ownership over a defined period.74  While often ascribed the term “Islamic 
bond,” it is important to understand sukuk differs from the traditional bond definition.  A 
bond usually represents pure debt on the part of the issuer and creates a lender/borrower 
relationship.  Repayment of the bond with any additional money would be akin to riba.  
Instead, sukuk represents an ownership stake (like the equity described earlier), for a set 
period, where a mudaraba contract (the trustee financing relationship) is created with a 
profit-sharing arrangement.75  Due to its nature as a form of debt securitization, most 
sukuk are issued either by governments (often through sovereign wealth funds) or 
government-backed private companies.  The recent, and now notorious, example of the 
default of Dubai World (the government-sponsored private development corporation) on 
its debt, which included a $3.5 billion sukuk, is an example of how private-issue sukuks 
often have attachment to host-nations. 
Until recently, sukuk were among the hottest trends in the global financial 
markets.  Their combination of presumed security and Islamic compatibility attracted 
investors.  Between the first recognized launch of a significant sukuk in Malaysia in 2001, 
and the 2007 sukuk, investment from the Gulf States alone was valued at over $40 
billion.76  The arrival of the “Great Recession,” however, and recent issues of potential 
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default and suspension of debt payment by large sukuk, such as Dubai World, have 
tempered investors’ enthusiasm for the product.  Perhaps the largest contributor to the 
loss of confidence in sukuk by non-Islamic investors has been the question of exactly 
which laws govern the repayment of the bond.  The Dubai World bonds were issued on 
the London exchange and, as such, are regarded (under British law) as being asset-
secured in the same way as conventional bonds (that is, that debt holders have recourse to 
a company’s physical assets as compensation in the event of default).  This conflicts with 
Islamic law in force in Dubai, however, where the company and its assets are 
headquartered.  Had the holders of the Dubai World sukuk not agreed to hold off on 
seeking compensation, there issue of whose law governs the sukuk would have been 
thrust to the fore.  For now, it remains an unresolved issue with the potential for problems 
down the road. 
Chapter II has served as primer on the basic issues of Islamic finance and 
economics.  As the following chapters will illustrate, however, Iran has not fully adopted 
a completely Islamic economic identity.  While the public sector, the government, 
purports to operate under the tenets of Islam, all the private sector mechanisms of Islamic 
finance found elsewhere in the Muslim world are not as thoroughly present in Iran.  The 
range of potential private sector financial products described here are lacking in Iran, and 
the private economy’s Islamic concerns are mostly limited to ensuring that the private 
sector is not involved in profiting from prohibited items.  Understanding the full potential 
of the public and private sectors of an Islamic financial system is key to recognizing the 
dearth of Islamic financial options in Iran’s private industry. The government’s virtual 
monopoly of the major sources of industry and economic production has limited the role 
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III. IRANIAN IDEOLOGY: THE ROLE OF ISLAM, 
GOVERNMENT, AND ECONOMICS 
A. FOUNDATIONS OF CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY IN IRAN 
1. Centralized Planning: The Sole Survivor of the Pahlavi State 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini once famously stated that the Iranian Islamic 
Revolution was not about “lowering the price of watermelons.”77  The Iranian Islamic 
Revolution sought to overturn many of the legacy social and government institutions of 
the Pahlavi state.  One legacy that was retained, however, was the economic central 
planning of the government.  Due to the influence of Marxists and other left-leaning 
Islamists in the Iranian Revolution in 1979, centralized economic planning continues to 
be the primary method of influencing economic development within the country. This 
central planning ultimately has been unsuccessful in drastically changing the Iranian 
economy from the days of the Shah.  Indeed, the combination of religious and political 
influences on what were potentially sound economic development plans resulted in a 
narrowing of the overall economy and has had no effect in reducing the deleterious role 
of government in the private sector.  While superficial indicators look good—GDP has 
grown significantly in recent years—this resulted from a global increase in a single 
commodity price (oil), rather than increased performance of the Iranian productive sector 
at large. 
2. Khomeini’s Personal Beliefs 
Ruhollah Khomeini was obviously not beholden to Western capitalist ideals of 
prosperity, nor did he believe those ideals had a place in an Islamic society.  His personal 
economic beliefs likely stem from two primary places: First, his rural upbringing, and 
second, his extensive study of the lives of the Prophet Muhammed and his Companion, 
the fourth Rightly Guided Caliph Ali bin Abi Talib.  The life stories of these two men 
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combined with Khomeini’s own personal upbringing of relative impoverishment to 
impart an affinity for the ascetic life that influenced Khomeini’s personal economic 
philosophy, as well as his model for economy of an Islamic state. 
Khomeini was born in the small town of Khumayn, approximately 60 miles 
southwest of Tehran, in 1902.78  His early life was marked by personal tragedy, religious 
indoctrination and study, and significant political turmoil in Iran.  The death of his father 
when Khomeini was five months old, and the death of his mother and aunt when he was 
age sixteen, encapsulated a period that also saw the constitutional revolution in Iran.  
Khomeini began studying religion early in life, and the Spartan lifestyle dictated by his 
rural setting combined with the ascetic influences of Islam’s early leaders to mold his 
early personality (remarked by his elder brother as being very serious, dedicated, and 
pious for one so young).79  As a young religious student, Khomeini witnessed the 
ascension of the Pahlavi dynasty to ultimately supplant the Qajar dynasty, and the 
contrast between the opulence of royalty—and the corruptness of that particular royal 
court—was such a contrast with his own personal philosophy that Khomeini was openly 
critical of the regime very early in his religious career.80 
Khomeini’s admiration for the lifestyles of the Prophet Muhammed and Caliph 
Ali were consistent themes in his speeches shortly before the Islamic revolution.  
Khomeini praised the austere lifestyle of the Prophet, often comparing it with the 
ostentatious lifestyles of contemporary Islamic rulers, and believed that it was the 
egregious expenditures of royal courts on pomp and ceremony that resulted in 
subordination of the Muslims to foreign powers.  Khomeini said, 
Most forms of corruption originate with the ruling class… and the 
libertines who associate with them.  It is these ruler who establish centers 
of vice and corruption, who build centers of vice and wine drinking, and 
spend the income of the religious endowments constructing cinemas…  If 
it were not for these profligate royal ceremonies, this reckless spending, 
this constant embezzlement, there would never be any deficit in the 
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national budget fording us to bow in submission before America and 
Britain and request aid or a loan from them.81 
Regarding Ali, Khomeini once remarked, “Even though that excellent man ruled 
over a vast realm that included Iran, Egypt, Hijaz, and the Yemen among its provinces, 
he lived more frugally than the most impoverished of our students.”82  He would also use 
Ali as an example of how the rule of the Imam could and should be used to correct social 
injustices.  From this central point of the appropriate role of the Imam as both spiritual 
and political leader of the state, Khomeini developed his idea of sovereignty of the jurist, 
velat-i-faqih.  When this philosophy was finally put to practice following the Islamic 
revolution in Iran, the ideal of social justice ultimately was used to create policies that 
ensured the authority of the state over all matters of life—especially the economy. 
B. IRAN’S VERSION OF ISLAMIC ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 
1.  Competing Visions Within the 1979 Islamic Revolution Regarding 
Islamic Economics 
The concept of justice is a central theme in Islam from its very beginnings.  The 
idea of social equality and justice applied across the spectrum of society’s classes, 
proffered by the Prophet Muhammad, was one of the key factors that enabled Islam to 
spread as far as it did in such a short time.83  Islamic economics, as a model for an entire 
state’s economic system, represents an ideal to further “a just and humane society, 
without the exploitation, domination, alienation, and other social ills that have afflicted 
contemporary… economies.”84  The idea of fairness of all aspects of a society is critical 
to Islam’s perceived primacy among its followers; the lack of justice and fairness of 
Iranian society under the Pahlavi regime was a main criticism leveled by Ayatollah 
Khomeini. 
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According to Khomeini, in an Islamic state—which, in his opinion, required an 
Imamate governed by shari’a—unconditional subordination to the state was a religious 
requirement.  When speaking about the appropriate nature of an Islamic state (prior to the 
Iranian Islamic Revolution), Khomeini said,  
It is also our duty to follow and obey the holders of authority, who, 
according to our beliefs are the Imams (upon whom be peace).  Of course, 
obedience to their governmental decrees is also a form of obedience to 
God.  Since God Almighty has commanded us to follow the Messenger 
and the holders of authority, our obeying them is actually an expression of 
obedience to God.85 
Thus, the state bears the authority of God in all instances, and disagreement with 
the actions of the state is an act of apostasy.  This is a critical point to understanding the 
complete subordination of all civil and economic aspects of the Iranian society to the 
government.  Further, the case of the Iranian brand of Islamic economics is unique, as 
Behdad points out, not only because of its distinct radicalism in comparison to other 
Muslim countries, but because of the totality of Islamic social order that was created 
following the 1979 revolution.  This totality represents an achievement in Islamization 
that has so far not been achieved through social reform in other countries.86 
As part of this Islamization, the nascent revolutionary government found more 
than ample theological justification for the role of the government as guarantor of social 
justice through direct economic participation.  One of the principle sources of this 
justification came from the respected Islamic theologian Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr.  Al-
Sadr was a notable Islamic scholar who had supported the Iranian revolution and had 
written specifically on the subject of an Islamic economic system.  His definitive work on 
the subject, Iqtisaduna (Our Economics) is still the work of record for many in the 
Islamic world.   
Although some within the Islamic community criticized al-Sadr for insinuating 
that Islam and capitalism were not only compatible but had common basic ideals, al-
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Sadr’s notion that Islamic economics was based on the notions of justice, fairness, and 
equality created a model that the Iranian Islamic revolutionaries could use to justify the 
role of the state in all aspects of life in the country.87  While al-Sadr believed in private 
property rights, they were (in his view) neither inherently natural nor irrevocable.  
Individuals, he believed, must look after the greater welfare of society, as proscribed by 
Divine Revelation, in exercising their private property rights.88   
Critically for the post-revolutionary government in Iran, al-Sadr proposed that the 
role of the state is to be a “positive check” on individual action, should those actions 
harm the welfare of society (as determined by the state).  Behdad states, “Social justice in 
an Islamic society, according to Sadr, is based on the principles of individual cooperation 
and state intervention.”89  This is important to understanding the basis for authority of the 
Iranian government with regard to wealth and power.  The government reserves the right 
to declare that any individual’s wealth is “excessive” and contrary to the public good.  In 
such a case, that person’s wealth may be “redistributed” at the discretion of the state.   
This aligns with the generally accepted belief among Islamic theologians that real 
property ownership can belong only to God.  The Qur’an (III:129) reads, “Unto Allah 
belongeth whatsoever is in the heaven and whatsoever is the earth,” and this (and similar 
passages) are interpreted as being a limit on the private property rights of individuals.  
This is significant to the Iranian Islamic regime, since in the philosophy of velat-i-faqih 
(sovereignty of the jurist) places the Imam as God’s representative on earth until the 
return of the Mahdi (awaited one).  Thus, the Imam, and therefore the government, has 
the legal and moral legitimacy to determine the appropriate right to property of the 
people. 
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2. Iranian Economics Following the Revolution: Idealism Becomes 
Authoritarian Populism 
Prior to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, proponents of Islamism in Iran presented 
little awareness of Islamic economics as a unique field of Islamic philosophical thought.  
As a result, following the revolution the political left heavily influenced formation of 
Iran’s economic system under Islam.90  Several prominent figures contributed to the 
sociological discourse that would eventually form the precept for Islamic governance in 
Iran.  Those revolutionaries with leftist (i.e., non-free market/capitalist) economic views 
were able to find common cause with several prominent Islamist figures at the time (such 
as al-Sadr, Shariati, and Banisadr). The left used many of al-Sadr’s economic principles 
regarding the role of government and the dangers of excessive accumulation of wealth in 
individuals to insinuate themselves in the prevailing economic thought.  Behdad 
summarizes al-Sadr’s position on the role of the state in ensuring social justice through 
economic controls:  
Everyone in a society must benefit from a socially acceptable standard of 
living, with variations only accounted for by differences in individuals’ 
drive and capacity… [and the] state must (1) own and operate those 
enterprises that require a high degree of concentration of capital, since 
individuals cannot/should not possess such a large mass of capital; and (2) 
[the] state must be continually engaged in the market to appropriate 
excessive accumulations.91 
There were other notable sources of justification for this interventionist role of 
government in the economic system, chief among them was Ali Shariati.  Shariati added 
to the left-leaning view of economics by his negative view of capitalism and private 
ownership—which he viewed as the source of all social ills and detrimental to a just and 
equitable society.  He believed in a struggle to a classless society, akin to many who 
subscribed to Marxism.  Given Shariati’s role and influence on the Iranian Revolution 
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with regard to social ideology, his view of an appropriate economic system was a 
significant influence in the early days of the Islamic Republic.92 
Abulhasan Banisadr, first President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and an 
economist trained at the Sorbonne, represented a more classically educated (in the 
secular, Western sense) member of the revolution.  His economic philosophy was 
influential, as Banisadr was deputy and later Finance Minister prior to ascension to the 
presidency.  Banisadr represented more of a hard-leftist view of economics; he believed 
labor to be the foundation of ownership and that accumulation of wealth represented 
dominance and coercion that created a false manifestation of scarcity.  Banisadr, 
crucially, rejected the appropriative power of the state, believing that it would lead to 
accumulation and coercion by the state itself.  This rejection of the role of the state 
separates Banisadr from the religious philosophers of Islamic economics and eventually 
limited the penetration of his economic ideals into Iranian society.93  Ironically, his 
notions regarding the coercive danger of accumulation would be used by the state for its 
own political ends to justify the appropriation of private property from potential 
opposition forces (just the kind of thing Banisadr ultimately feared).  While Banisadr’s 
falling out with Khomeini led to his exile, it is highly likely that his institutional 
influence in Iran’s economic system remained for some time later. 
In an attempt to consolidate power and institutionalize the principle of velat-i-
faqih, on 21 April 1980 Ayatollah Khomeini, now installed as the Supreme Leader of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, declared that Iranian universities were “centers for propagating 
‘Eastern and Western ideas,’” and closed those institutions to facilitate the 
“reconstructing” of humanities and social science textbooks.94  The work concentrated 
heavily on economics and eventually issued the volume Introduction to Islamic 
Economics.  Significantly, this work broke with traditional jurist thought by declaring 
Islamic economics very compatible a market-based, neoclassical economic system.  The 
authors (doctors of seminaries known as the modarressin hozeh-ye’elmi-ye, or 
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Modarressin, assisted by professional economists) adhered to the least restrictive 
interpretations on the limits of private property rights and free markets.  The Modarressin 
explicitly recognized the need to balance economic growth against social equity and, in 
contradiction to Sadr and Banisadr, recognized the profit motive and the rationality of 
market prices.   
Also in opposition to traditional Islamic economic theorists, the Mondarressin 
argued that one’s own direct labor is not a limiting feature on one’s ability to benefit from 
the “fruits of nature.”  Traditionally, it was felt that one should not profit from wage labor 
by others to cultivate a natural resource.  As an example, if a farmer could not personally 
farm all of his land, he could hire people to cultivate the land, but he could not profit 
from their labor himself.  Instead, he would need to divide up the profit amongst the 
workers, keeping no share for his own.  This is in keeping with the idea that ultimately 
only God may own the land, and those who work the land are entitled to all its rewards 
directly; the only source of ownership is work, according to the traditional scholars.  The 
Mondarressin, on the other hand, believed that workers needed only to receive “fair” 
wages, and this, in turn, helps out those who may not be able to labor themselves.  The 
Mondarressin argument in favor of this rests in their opinion that whatever individuals 
own “is either based on direct labor or by the use of their property which has its origin in 
their labor or the labor of those who have transferred such ownership to them.”95 
Key to the acceptance of this philosophy was its endorsement by Khomeini, who 
had made several legal rulings in line with the Mondarressin economic reasoning.  
Khomeini had no problem with market-based capitalism, as such, so long as it did not 
interfere or challenge the monopoly on legitimacy maintained by the jurist.  Khomeini is 
distinct in iterating the supremacy of the Islamic government, and the Supreme Leader in 
particular, in all matters of life in Iran.  Regarding how this manifested itself in an 
economic ideology and the limits of private ownership, Behdad says, 
He leaves no doubt that Islam sanctions property ownership, but that 
sanction is based on the legitimacy of the source.  In 1979 when the 
Revolutionary Islamic Courts were engaged in extensive expropriation of 
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property, Khomeini added, “we will deal with these big capitalists, whose 
capital and wealth could not have become so large from legitimate 
sources.”   Moreover, Khomeini states, “even if we assume someone has 
legitimate properties but the Islamic judge or vali-ye faqih realizes than an 
individual’s having so much will adversely affect the welfare of Muslims, 
he can expropriate those properties.96 
Thus, the economic ideology of Iran became solidified shortly after the revolution: 
the individual, under Islam, had a right to private property.  But the limits of the right were 
to be determined by the supreme jurist under the auspices of social justice.  As a result, the 
state could expropriate property as it saw fit, for whatever reasons it saw fit. 
In addition to this philosophy regarding personal property, Khomeini’s 
government subscribed to other tenets of Islamic philosophical thought that empowered 
the state.  Another such example is the role of government and private enterprise.  Al-
Sadr, Shariati, and Banisadr all see a role for government in operating the large engines 
of production.  Though they each have their own thresholds of the ultimate extent of 
governmental participation, these three generally agree that an Islamic government is the 
best repository for control of large companies and other capital-intensive organizations.  
The rationale is that when the large companies are controlled by individuals, those people 
become inordinately wealthy and contribute to social disparity.  The concern of these 
wealthy individuals becomes enhancing their own wealth and power, not the welfare of 
the wider Islamic community.  The wealthy individual, in Khomeini’s view, cannot be 
relied upon to safeguard the justice and harmony in the community of Muslims (the 
umma).  On the other hand, the Islamic government headed by the Imam has but one 
concern: social justice according to the Qur’an and the tenets of Islam for the community 
as a whole. 
This notion legitimized the Islamic revolutionary government’s economic policies 
of nationalization during and after the revolution.  During this period, what Behdad terms 
the “Revolutionary Disruptions,” the nationalizations began as worker takeovers of plants 
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where the ownership had fled the country in advance of the Islamic Revolution.97   
Immediately following the consolidation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, 
however, real nationalization began in the summer of 1979.  Banks, insurance companies, 
and some large manufacturing enterprises were confiscated and became state-owned. 
In furtherance of the Islamic economic philosophical view that individuals could 
be a threat to the social justice of the state, the Revolutionary Islamic Courts seized the 
assets of many deemed “anti-revolutionary.”  These were then declared under “public 
ownership”—an important distinction in Islamic jurisprudence, as it is separate from state 
ownership.  “Public” entities are at the sole disposal of the Imam to determine their 
appropriate use in “strengthening Islam and [the] society of Muslims.”98  Khomeini 
formed special foundations to direct “public” assets, and the takeover of companies by 
the government for the purpose of making them “public” became, at times, a means of 
mass mobilization used by the regime. 
Understanding the Islamic philosophical difference between “pubic” and “state” 
property is important to framing the issue.  In Islamic jurisprudence, if property is 
appropriated for the “public,” the state “may use [the property] in such a way that all the 
public, without specific exclusions, may benefit.”  According to al-Sadr, schools and 
hospitals are examples of legitimate public property.  But “state” property, on the other 
hand, can benefit special groups; such as to benefit people needing investment assistance.  
The determination of what is public and what is state is made by Islamic law (Behdad 
gives the example of conquered lands prepared for cultivation as “public” and “state” if it 
is unprepared).99 
The emplacement of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s formal Constitution did little 
in the long run to assure any right to property of the individual.  Article 44 of the 
Constitution is explicit, stating that, in its desire to champion the oppressed over the 
oppressors, it diminishes the role of the private sector of the economy and relegates it to a 
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supplanting role to the state and cooperative sectors.  What criteria for the classification 
of protected private property are laid out in Article 49 are vague and obviously designed 
to ensure that any property may be declared illegitimate by the jurist.100 
The ease with which Islamic economic philosophy, as articulated by Khomeini 
and the Iranian Constitution, transformed into economic populism is strikingly clear.  The 
direct causes of this transformation are also, in retrospect, also clear. First, the need to 
consolidate power behind the Khomeini’s regime necessitated continued appeasement of 
its socio-political base: the rural peasantry.  Secondly, the initiation of the Iran-Iraq War 
so shortly after the formation of the Islamic government exerted tremendous social 
pressure on the Iranian people.  The cost in terms of lives lost and the dire economic 
impact of the eight-year struggle combined to consistently threaten the regime from 
within.  After the June 1981 removal of President Banisadr, the lone secularly-trained 
influence on the new regime was gone and the religious establishment assumed control of 
all aspects of the state. Consequently, the debates regarding the clerics’ different 
economic philosophies were thrust into the public view.  
Specifically, the clerical conflict was between those of the populist/statist 
ideological interpretation on the left (those of the al-Sadr ideology) and those on the right 
with what Behdad calls the “laissez faire” policy.  The former group argued for extensive 
state control over the entire economy and the latter for a more free-market approach.  For 
those of the laissez faire disposition, the concern was the prohibition of unacceptable 
practices (riba, deceit, theft, production of alcohol and pork, monopoly, conspiracy, and 
price fixing to create monopolies), not state intervention in the economy or redistribution 
of wealth.101  The conflict between these two camps bore out between the Majlis, a body 
dominated by the populists, and the Council of Guardians, which had to approve all laws 
enacted by the Majlis and tended toward a more free-market approach.  Through most of 
the Iran-Iraq War period, the Majlis would pass laws that were decidedly populist, only to 
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have them rejected by the Guardian Council as un-Islamic.  This left Ayatollah Khomeini 
as the final authority, and his support for either side was inconsistent.102 
As a result of the often-irreconcilable differences between the two bodies of 
government, economic policy during this period was mostly ad hoc and undertaken to 
avert serious crises and forestall potentially disastrous economic failures.  Consequently, 
the 1980s was a period of no real economic planning and hobbled development.  The 
exigent burdens of the Iran-Iraq War placed additional stress on Iran and its economy.  
The ad hoc nature of economic policy meant that most of the non-hydrocarbon 
production during this period was for war-related products, which created few expansive 
effects on the overall economy.  Chapter IV will discuss the Iranian economy during the 
Iran-Iraq War more thoroughly, but suffice it to say that the war’s heavy reliance on 
numbers of troops in place of military hardware and technology meant that the industrial 
capacity of Iran atrophied during the conflict and, as a result, the anemic industrial sector 
was unable to boost the economy in the post-war period (as is often seen after long 
conflicts when the means of production shift from producing war materiel to consumer 
and industrial products). 
The stalemate between the Majlis and Guardian Council during this period 
reached such an impasse that, in February 1988, Khomeini created the “Assembly for 
Discerning the Interests of the System of the Islamic Republic” (also known as the 
“Expediency Council”).  This 13-member council existed to resolve disputes between the 
Majlis and the Guardian Council.103  Empowered with legislative authority to create and 
pass laws (which were limited to three years of efficacy), the Expediency Council was 
created to be the bridge between the two conflicting governmental bodies.  Failing a 
resolution to the disputes, the Expediency Council could at least provide ad hoc solutions 
to prevent the complete seizure of government from the deadlock between the Majlis and  
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Guardian Council.  Valibeigi credits the creation of the Expediency Council, and the 
death of Ayatollah Khomeini not long afterward, with the rise of a more pragmatist 
economic philosophy in Iran. 
The conditions that deadlocked the Iranian government’s policy-making bodies 
did not arise by coincidence, but were instead a direct result of Khomeini’s actions.  The 
Majlis, as representative of the generally rural peasantry that supported the Islamic 
Revolution, was naturally predisposed to a populist economic philosophy.  This segment 
of the society had been generally excluded from what prosperity was realized under the 
Shah.  As Iran developed, and focused mostly on its hydrocarbon and manufacturing 
sectors, the rural and agrarian populations did not see a corresponding rise in their 
standard of living.  The rural to urban migration that coincided with the Pahlavi 
development strategy further aggravated tensions among the poor.  For the less well-off, 
the 1979 Iranian revolution was as much about socio-economic disparity as it was a 
religious movement.  Khomeini’s promises of social justice through Islam and the 
validity of redistribution of wealth under the banner of Islamic jurisprudential legitimacy 
were highly motivating to this population, and they were a key source of Khomeini’s 
support. 
The Guardian Council, on the other hand, represented influential elements of the 
clerical establishment as well as the bazaaris, the historical Iranian merchant class.  Both 
these groups had philosophical leanings toward private enterprise and market economies, 
as well as belief in the legitimacy of the individual’s right to pursue wealth through 
business.  While ulama did believe that there was an appropriate role for the Imam to 
ensure social justice is not infringed by the wealthy and powerful, they did not 
necessarily believe the state should be the main engine in the economy.  Khomeini 
needed the ulama and the bazaaris as much as he needed the peasant class. The ulama 
provided legitimacy to his religious interpretations (Khomeini was not a Grand Ayatollah 
and, thus, had not reached the status of emulation where his rulings became fatwa, or a 
ruling of Islamic law that adherents are required to follow) and the bazaaris ultimately 
had the expertise to make the non-state sectors of the economy work.  As a result of the 
attempt to satisfy both political camps, Khomeini created a system in which he was the 
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continual tie-breaker.  The drawback, however, was that after Khomeini’s death the 
populists retained their ability to hobble the more progressive economic plans of the 
Rafsanjani and Khatami administrations. 
Following Khomeini’s death on 6 June 1989, the position of the Presidency of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran grew in prominence and influence with regard to domestic 
political and economic agendas.  While the elevation of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to the 
post of Supreme Leader meant he technically inherited all the Constitutional powers of 
his predecessor, he lacked much of the personal charisma and gravitas which Khomeini 
possessed that bound so many to him and allowed him to exert influence across claimants 
in the revolution.  Khamenei, a former president of Iran under Khomeini, lacked the 
ability to resolve disputes through personal influence in the way his predecessor had.  
Khamenei was the compromise choice of the hard right clerical establishment after the 
fall from favor of Khomeini’s previously anointed successor, Ayatollah Ali Hussein 
Montazeri; and Khamenei’s “lackluster theological credentials” meant that he lacked the 
ability to stand independent of the support of the clerical establishment.  The hard-right 
clerics, in turn, depended on Khamenei’s position as Supreme Leader to enact their 
conservative religious agenda.104    
According to Takeyh, this lack of a decisive political figure in Iran that could 
either unite the disparate parties, or issue decisions acceptable because of the legitimacy 
of the personal authority of the Supreme Leader led to conflict and impasse as the 
competing factions within the government fought for influence: 
The simmering conflicts that had been held in check by Khomeini’s 
authority now became all too evident… In essence, the tensions between 
the regime’s revolutionary ideals and its practical requirements burst to the 
surface, bedeviling Iran’s new rulers.  Without Khomeini available to 
resolve these disputes, stalemate and deadlock became the new currency 
of Iranian politics.105 
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Khamenei has proved an adroit political operator, however, and has not just 
survived as Supreme Leader for twenty years, but has managed to inculcate the 
conservative political ideology in Iran’s non-elected political institutions.  The militant 
conservative control of the Guardian Council, the Supreme Leader’s office, the judiciary, 
the Revolutionary Guard Corps (the parallel to the conventional armed forces, under the 
direct control of the Supreme Leader), and the basij (the volunteer paramilitary militia 
often used as a coercive force) all serve to ensure the political hegemony of the 
conservative religious ideologues.106 
As Chapter IV will show, the conflict between conservative ideology, populism, 
and more progressive elements in the Iranian government illustrated in this chapter 
created an economic system where, despite attempts at central planning by reformers to 
develop the Iranian economy has failed to meet its development potential.  The influence 
of populists and hard liners continually prevented effective reform of the economy.  The 
election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the Presidency in 2005 resulted in dismantlement 
of the potential for economic development in Iran through a combination of hard-line 
conservative political rhetoric, courting of international economic sanctions (through 
pursuit of nuclear enrichment), and domestic populist ideology.  Hydrocarbons have 
formed the greatest portion of expansion in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) since the year 
2000, and the current regime has used this to fund extensive domestic subsidies to 
effectively buy political quietism.  These subsidies, estimated at between 18% and 30% 
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In the end, the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was also the death of the 
last vestiges of the attempt to transform Iran into an Islamic economy in keeping with a 
consistent philosophical approach.  The problem was that Khomeini created a system 
dependent on his personality to function, not necessarily on a specific set of consistent  
Islamic economic ideals.  After his death, the Iranian economy became another issue of 
contestation between the competing ideals of the populists and the pragmatists.  While 
economic progressives held the Presidency from 1989 until 2005, the populists in the 
Majlis and the hard-line ideology of Khomeini’s successor, Ayatollah Khamenei, 
checked their plans for economic development.  Ahmadinejad’s ascendency to the 
Presidency in 2005 further entrenched the power of populism and has increased state 
involvement in the private sector through by using the Revolutionary Guard Corps to 
control formerly private companies. These actions, behind the banner of Khomeini’s 
revolutionary ideals of the proper role of the state to guarantee social justice, indicate that 




IV. THE IRANIAN ECONOMY (1979–2009) 
A. THE ECONOMY BEFORE THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 
Central economic planning was the method favored by the Iranian government for 
30 years before the revolution and originated in the wake of the systems developed in the 
Soviet Union, China, and India.  Unlike these countries, Iran’s was not a comprehensive 
input-output based plan; rather, it issued expressions of official intent with regard to the 
distribution of oil-export revenue among public investment projects.108  At the time, 
Iran’s “technocratic” approach to economic development (increasing output by 
encouraging either the adoption of improved technology or by increasing greater 
incorporation of conventional inputs, such as capital) seemed in line with the country’s 
stated “liberal capitalist ideology.”109   
The problem, however, lay in the execution of this capitalist ideology.  Rather 
than trusting in the private sector, where the free-market and competition would combine 
with Adam Smith’s “hidden hand” to achieve economic progress, in the Pahlavi state 
property ownership was “highly concentrated” in a trusted few closest to the regime.110  
In this case, the technocratic approach served only to increase the disparity in income 
among the population.  This was welcomed by the state, as its theory was that the very 
wealthy would be able to turn a greater percentage of this income around and reinvest it, 
thereby increasing the relative rate of economic output.  This policy was unfortunate for 
two reasons: first, the obvious popular discontent fueled by the relative depravation of the 
vast majority of the population compared to the few well-off social and political elites.  
Second, further analysis showed that reducing the disparity in income would actually 
have raised the national output and lowered unemployment and under-employment since 
the rate of increase of consumption of a population usually outpaces the rate of increase 
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in saving.111  The Pahlavi economic policies sowed the seeds for the revolution, both in 
terms of social disparity as well as economic under-performance. 
In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, the idea of central economic 
planning was maintained largely because of the influence, at the time, of Islamist 
Marxists and “left-leaning populist clergy.”112  To complicate the process, however, the 
Khomeini regime also added social and cultural aspects to the existing economic 
planning process.  Khomeini’s notions of velat-i faqih (sovereignty of the jurist) meant 
that he, and the Supreme Leaders who would follow him, must have governance over all 
aspects—cultural, religious, social, and economic—of the umma.  Thus the ideas of 
economic development are subordinated to the interests of the social development of the 
state. This made what was a difficult task under the Shah’s anemic administrative 
capacity nearly impossible in the post-revolution Islamic state. 
B. THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR 
Further complicating the task of developing the Iranian economy after the 1979 
revolution was the war with Iraq that began in 1980 and consumed a majority of the 
military, political, social, and economic resources of the country for the following 
decade.  The Iran-Iraq War prevented the type of centralized economic planning that had 
characterized the Pahlavi state.113  Two reasons for this likely exist.  The first, and most 
obvious, reason is that the war was an economic catastrophe for Iran.  The effects of the 
war on the Iranian economy will be examined in greater detail subsequently, but for now 
it is sufficient to say that the constant and severe tax on Iran’s resources of blood and 
treasure limited it to ad hoc economic policy rather than well thought out development 
strategy.   
The second reason for the hiatus of central economic planning was its lack of 
appeal to Ayatollah Khomeini.  The man unconcerned with the price of watermelons was 
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similarly unconcerned with the economic factors affecting the price of the watermelon in 
the first place.  Evidence supporting this is found in the elevation of economic issues to a 
place of primacy in the regimes that followed Khomeini.114  This was a subtle, though 
tacit, rebuke of that part of the Supreme Leader’s guidance. 
It is difficult to emphasize the severity and rapidity with which the Iran-Iraq war 
wrecked the Iranian economy.  By the end of 1981 foreign exchange reserves fell from 
$14.6 billion at the end of the Pahlavi regime, to $1 billion at the close of 1981.  While 
the government initially relied on oil production to sustain the economy, the increases of 
1982 and ’83 (to $19 billion from $12 billion in 1981) were not sustainable.  By 1984 and 
’85, revenues were back at $12–13 billion and continued to fall ($6.6 billion in 1986).  
The consequential 50% unemployment by 1987 resulted in the government creating 
schemes to mobilize labor (specifically in the agricultural sector) by exempting members 
of “The Reconstruction Campaign” from military service and sending them instead to 
rural areas. Additionally the government sought to ration precious foreign currency by 
limiting imports of “non-essential” products. 115  
As for the idea of a truly Islamic economic system in Iran, one cold consider it a 
casualty of the Iran-Iraq War as well.  Behdad states, 
The war with Iraq, economic sanction, and above all, the decline in oil 
revenues of Iran in 1985 and 1986 brought the utopian project in 
construction of an Islamic economic order to a dead end.  In nearly a 
decade of social turmoil, war, and ad hoc policy making, the productive 
capacity of the economy had dwindled… The only manifestation of 
Islamization of the market was the replacement of interest rates with an 
elaborate system of fees, awards, lottery and “guaranteed profit” in the 
state banking system… [T]here was little to show for Islamic economics 
in the Iranian society.  Islamic economics had obviously failed, the project 
of economic liberalization, with all its bells and whistles, began.116  
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C. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AFTER THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR 
1. The First Development Plan: 1989–1993 
Following the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war, the imminent need to restore the 
nation to a functioning economic foundation was obvious.  Precipitous to this was the 
death of Khomeini in 1989, which allowed more economically progressive personalities 
to influence the country’s policies.  The election of Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in 
1989 signaled the arrival of a bazaar and market-friendly political group whose focus 
would be the economy as a method to improve the livelihood of Iranians.  The Rafsanjani 
government’s decision to enact the “structural adjustment program” which came to be 
known as the First Development Plan was “a substantial turn toward a new global 
paradigm.”117 
The first Plan entailed a complete restructuring of the Iranian economy that would 
decouple the government from control in the private sector, reduce the trade 
protectionism that was used in a (misguided) attempt to stimulate domestic production, 
unification of Iran’s fracture exchange-rate system, tax reform, reorganization of the 
banking system, and cost-price adjustments to deal with inflationary pressures.118  While 
the free-market orientation of this plan belies its origins in central planning, this resulted 
from the decimation of the Iranian private sector in the aftermath of the Revolution and 
the war with Iraq.  There were no institutions at the time capable of stimulating the type 
of market activities the Rafsanjani government wanted; the only path, they believed, was 
for the government to guide privatization and modernization. 
Several unique factors helped the Iranian economy during the First Development 
period that propelled the nation’s economic performance to unseen post-revolution levels.  
First, a large and relatively unused industrial capacity that was no longer required to 
devote production to the Iraq war.119  While Iraq fought the war with a strategy centered 
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on the use of a modern military that required the national support of heavy industry, 
Iran’s strategy centered on the use of men vice equipment.120  This strategy robbed the 
industrial sector of much of its workforce and hobbled what capacity remained by 
requiring it to produce goods solely in support of the war.  Second, oil prices rose sharply 
in the years immediately following the Iran-Iraq war (with a significant peak after Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait).121  
Figure 1.   Oil price per barrel (in USD). Highlighted period reflects period covered by 
First Development Plan.  From U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2007122  
The importance of oil for the Iranian economy rose dramatically during the war 
with Iraq.  Military expenditures rose as oil revenues declined (initially, due to the 
inherent difficulties of getting oil to market during the war) to a point that Iran’s foreign 
exchange reserves of $14.6 billion—inherited from the Shah’s regime—was reduced to 
only $1 billion by 1981.  The government forced national industries to mobilize in 
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support of the war effort and this left little spare capacity to create value added goods to 
be sold for revenue.  This is why for the majority of the war the Iranian government 
focused on oil production as its main source of economic production.123 
Third, the Rafsanjani regime made extensive use of short-term commercial credits 
to spur economic activity.124  These credits were necessary to spur the type of private-
sector economic activity that was absent for most of the war.  Specifically, the aim was to 
enlarge Iran’s anemic middle class, which had suffered due to state direction during the 
war years virtually eliminating private-sector growth. 
The fourth helpful factor for the First Development Plan was that the population 
growth rate began to fall.125  Due to the personnel centric nature of the Iranian military 
strategy during the Iraq war (meaning a strategy with extremely high casualty rates and a 
reliance on refilling those lost ranks), the regime and the ulama had for some time 
encouraged prodigious reproduction among the population as their religious and patriotic 
duty.126  The state was not successful in this campaign and, by the time of the First 
Development Plan and the end of the war, the combination of low birth rate and loss of 
population during the war resulted in a smaller productive sector and a relative increase 
in production rates in the workforce. 
The aforementioned factors combined to assist the First Development Plan in 
achieving an average GDP growth rate of approximately 7%—a significant improvement 
from the earlier years.  However, the Plan was not categorically a success, as it failed to 
achieve many of its specific quantitative improvement targets; it was not uniform in 
improving sectors across the economy, and overall failed to meet some of its most 
ambitious goals.  Specifically, by the admission of the Plan’s architects, it failed to meet 
its desired goals in privatization as well as exchange and trade liberalization, due to poor 
implementation.127  The result of this was a poor showing of the private sector of the 
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economy (real GDP growth of 1.6%) and increasing short-term foreign debt that created 
inflationary pressures (at 35%) that affected the implementation of the Second 
Development Plan. 
2. The Second Development Plan: 1995–2000 
Due to the “considerable wrangling” over the benefit and intelligence of 
Rafsanjani’s structural adjustment program caused by the confluence of negative 
economic factors, the Second Development Plan did not follow immediately on the heels 
of the First.  Rather, on the pretext of examining factors such as “earlier miscalculations, 
excessive credit-creation, foreign short-term borrowing, a slump in crude-oil prices, [and] 
a growing volume of external payment arrears,” the Majlis postponed starting the Second 
Plan from March 1994 until March 1995.128  One of the largest causes for delay was the 
unsolved problem of Iran’s exchange-rate system. 
One of the main goals of the First Plan was the unification of the multiple 
exchange rates that had been created to govern various sectors during the Iran-Iraq war.  
Because of the aforementioned macro-economic issues that arose following the war, the 
exchange rate was not unified until March 1993 (and then at a “floating rate” of 1,600 
Iranian rials (RI) per dollar; a figure much depressed from the precursor rate of RI 70). 
The unified rate did not last for long, however, due to the Central Bank’s inability to 
access world capital markets, which limited its ability to service external debt and control 
inflation. 129  The government abandoned the unified rate in December 1993 and was 
further unable to sustain a second official rate of RI 1,750/dollar in May of 1994 as it was 
not sustained by the free-market rate.  To combat this, the government re-instated strict 
controls on foreign currency allocation and trade, and created a special “export rate” of 
exchange of RI 2,345 to finance “non-essential” imports.  Thus the government achieved 
a measure of reduction in their imbalances.130 
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Iran’s Second Economic, Social and Cultural Plan (the official name) began on 20 
March 1995 amid dubious economic circumstances.  The public sector, government 
provided subsidies and bureaucracy were disproportionately large; exacerbated 
inflationary pressures were constant; and poor management of state revenues, external 
debt servicing, exchange-rate regimes, and return on consumer savings against inflation 
by the government and financial system.131  As a result, the Second Plan was less about 
grand economic development, and more about fixing the broken parts of the Iranian 
economic system through accelerated structural reforms.  While the economic 
calculations behind the Second Plan were more realistic than those of the First, the list of 
goals remained a hodgepodge collection of worn ideals.  The quantitative targets, broken 
down to various categories and sub-categories (see Appendix A), reflected the continued 
desire to achieve increased growth (as measured by GDP) through an increase in private-
sector investment and a relative decrease in government consumption.132   
Interestingly, many of the Second Development Plan’s economic policies would 
fit well into those prescribed by today’s Washington Consensus.  Reduction of the size 
and scope of government in the business sector, improved rule of law, control of 
population growth through non-coercive means, increase in employment through 
enhanced education and training of the workforce, etc., were some the Plan’s proposed 
methods of economic development.133 
Evaluating the relative success of the Second Development Plan is difficult, as 
reliable statistical data is scarce.  A few conclusions can be made, however, from the data 
that is available.  In general, external government debt and budget deficits were reduced 
and Iran was able to control its financial sector to the point where it could take tentative 
steps back into international financial markets (including World Bank loans).  In general, 
the successes of the Second Development Plan were in reduction of rates of increase (of 
consumer prices, population, etc.), rather than wholesale reduction of aggregate numbers.  
More critically, however, to the overall evaluation of the Plan is the country’s showing in 
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overall human-development rankings during this period.  According to the UNDP, Iran 
fell from 78 to 97 among 175 countries listed on the human-development index.  In 
looking at the global data for the period, while Iran improved relative to itself, other 
nations (19 of them) improved at a greater rate during this time frame.134     
3. The Third Development Plan: 2000–2005 
President Rafsanjani’s second and final (due to constitutional limitations) term 
expired in May 1997.  His successor, Sayyed Muhammad Khatami assumed the 
Presidency halfway through the Second Development Plan and his administration was the 
sole architect of the Third Development Plan in 1998–1999.135  From the beginning, the 
effort suffered the Herculean task of attempting to reconcile a program for economic 
growth and expansion with policy guidelines from the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, to 
“pursue frugality and parsimony in consumption,” as well as other mandates to encourage 
adherence to the late Ayatollah Khomeini’s “religious and political thoughts.”136   
As with previous development plans, the one submitted to the Majlis concerned 
itself with decoupling the government from Iran’s anemic state-dominated economy and 
moving the economy toward a more internationally-oriented free market, a reduction of 
reliance on oil exports, privatize the largest industries, movement off rentier economics, 
reduction of subsidies, and a general removal of government interference in the private 
sector.137  However, just as with the previous Plans, politics trumped economic principles 
when the bill arrived at the Majlis.  Interestingly, it was the two ends of the political 
spectrum—the Islamic Marxists and “welfare ideologues” combined with “the bazaar and 
rent-endowed clerics”—in the Majlis and Guardians Council who found unique common 
ground in opposition to the Third Plan.138 
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This political interference resulted in the Third Development Plan losing much of 
the economic teeth it needed to implement reform.  Specifically removed were the 
following provisions: 
 Postponement of the retirement age; this would allow the government to 
save the government pension fund which was in bankruptcy. 
 Establishment of a “means test” for groups receiving government 
subsidies.  This would aid in reducing the ever-present budget deficits. 
 An allowance of state enterprises to raise administrative prices in an 
attempt to recover some of their costs. 
 An order ending tax exemptions for all public agencies and semi-public 
charitable foundations. 
 A plan to gradually raise the highly subsidized energy prices to a level 
commensurate with international standards.139 
The result of all the contestation over the Plan resulted in a delay of seven 
months, and the Majlis finally ratified the Plan Law on 5 April 2000.  The final document 
was a monolithic work of chapters, clauses, and sub-clauses that dealt with a myriad of 
“goals, means, directives, policies and appropriations in a convoluted and poorly 
organized format.”140  And all this came at a significant financial cost, 804 trillion rials 
($114 billion) that would be financed from oil exports ($60 billion), non-oil exports 
($34.5 billion) exports of “technical and engineering services” ($7.5 billion), and credit 
and loans borrowed abroad ($12 billion).141 
The outcomes of the Third Development Plan, while somewhat mixed, were 
mostly negative.  On the positive side, the annual real growth of oil and non-oil GDP was 
respectable (if slightly less than projected—see Appendix C), population growth fell to 
near its target value of 1.5%, real per-capita income rose by an average of 3.8% annually, 
and services and industry were the biggest contributors to GDP growth.142  Other 
performance factors were not as positive, however.  Public and private consumption 
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exceeded growth targets significantly (65–85%)143 as the plan was unable to reduce 
growth in aggregate consumption in exchange for increasing fixed-capital formation.  
This resulted from greater credit and liquidity at the consumer level caused by plentiful 
oil receipts and new consumer habits of “one-upmanship” influenced by effective 
advertising.144  Total investment as a percentage of GDP was also less than need to 
achieve the goal of full employment. 
The Iranian government found success in some of its market-oriented reforms.  
The multiple exchange-rate system was, finally, unified in March 2002 and most current 
account restriction ended. Additionally, foreign trade liberalized as non-tariff barriers 
were rationalized into tariffs, export-licensing procedures were improved, and export 
restrictions lifted.  Also, the Central Bank was modernized and authorized to issue 
“participation papers” (short-term government bonds) to contain inflation by mopping up 
excess liquidity.  Finally, the government succeeded in tax code reformation and the 
creation of the Oil Stabilization Fund (OSF) to help absorb negative effects of oil price 
fluctuations.145 
The overall failure to meet many of the structural reform goals of the system, 
however, overshadowed what success there was in achieving specific quantitative 
targets.146  Eleven failures resulted in the ultimate inability of the Third Development 




                                                 
143 IMF, “Islamic Republic of Iran: Statistical Appendix,” IMF Country Report No. 07/101 (March 
2007): 11. 
144 Amuzegar, “Iran’s Third Development Plan,” 51. 
145 IMF, “Islamic Republic of Iran– Selected Issues,” IMF Working Paper No. 04/308 (September 
2004):  23.  Amuzegar, “Iran’s Third Development Plan,” 52. 
146 IMF, “Islamic Republic of Iran– Selected Issues,” 57.  (See Appendix D) 
147 Amuzegar, “Iran’s Third Development Plan,” 53–60. IMF, “Islamic Republic of Iran–Selected 
Issues,” 36. 
 56
 Failures to consolidate, reorganize, and downsize of the government’s 
administrative bureaucracy.  Government expenditure, as a ratio of GDP, 
actually rose from 1999 to 2004. 
 Inability to control prices (either through cost-cutting or increased 
productivity). 
 Poor results at privatization.  
 Failure to end the subsidy system.  Explicit and implicit subsidies are 
estimated by the World Bank to require 17% of GDP (5 and 12%, 
respectively). 
 Failure to curb poverty. 
 Continued lack of job opportunities.  In fact, unemployment actually 
increased by some estimates. 
 Failure to prevent continued budget deficits. 
 Misuse and depletion of the Oil Stabilization Fund. 
 Inability to protect the domestic currency, resulting in a steady decline in 
the rial against global currencies during the period, and a loss of 80% of 
real domestic purchasing power. 
 Inability to reduce wasteful use of energy resources.  Energy consumption 
rose 5 times more quickly than the global average during the period. 
 Failure to set environmental protection and conservation policies. 
As a result of these failures, many of the structural reforms of the Third 
Development Plan were never realized.  During its period of implementation the 
government expanded in size and state institutions became less disciplined and more 
corrupt, all the while increasing its dependence on oil revenue.148 
4. The Fourth Development Plan: 2005–2009 
March 2005 heralded the arrival of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Fourth 
Development Plan, the issuance of which coincided with the publication of “Iran’s 20-
Year Economic Perspective.”  This additional document detailed the long-term plans for 
Iran’s development (economically, politically, socially, and culturally) through 2025.  
“The 20-Year Perspective” stated that, after four more development plans, Iran would use 
its Islamic revolutionary identity to assume the lead among 28 Middle East and Southeast 
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Asian countries in economic, scientific, and technology issues.149  The specific economic 
goals were the same, however, as those issued in the three preceding five-year plans.  
Fast-paced (and sustainable) economic growth, lowering unemployment, better factor 
productivity, operations in international markets, economic development with low 
inflation and food security, and creation of a successful entrepreneurial market 
environment were the 20-Year plan’s objectives. 
The Fourth Development Plan (which was the first in the 20-Year Perspective) 
was not, however, a very auspicious beginning.  Rather, the Fourth Plan continued in the 
vein of the previous plans failures to make progress in developing the Iranian economy 
more than incrementally.  As the Fourth Plan reached its designated expiration data a 
short three months ago, the academic community has yet to issue much in the way of 
comprehensive analysis of the specific successes, failures, or non-starts of the plan.  An 
examination of broad macroeconomic data, however, can lead to some basic analysis of 
the general impacts of the plan.   
Overall the plan had five basic goals: economic growth, price stability, lower 
unemployment, increased investment, and reduction of oil-export receipts as a percentage 
of the overall economy.150 
a. Economic Growth  
Data for 2009 is still subject to reconciliation, though it is available for 
some sectors.  Comprehensive data is available through 2008 and is sufficient to 
extrapolate performance for the remaining year of the Fourth Plan.  As is indicated in 
Figure 2, GDP growth has occurred during the Fourth Plan period. Overwhelmingly, 
however, the boom in oil prices caused GDP growth as Iran’s industrial and export sector 
did not produce significant improvements to production.151  Further, the GDP growth is 
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expected to continue to shrink as oil revenues fell in 2009 along with the precipitous drop 
in the commodity’s global price following its zenith in 2008. 
In addition, stagnant total factor productivity proved a drag on economic 
performance as well.  The Plan called for 2.5% of projected 8% GDP growth to be from 
increases in total factor productivity.152  In reality, while labor productivity rose and 
estimated 0.57% annually throughout the Plan, total factor productivity has declined due 
to low capital returns.  This resulted, in large part, from the size of the government (with 
its lax supervision of state employees’ productivity) in the private sector, lack of 
sufficient inputs for factories to operate at or near capacity, and the number of official 
holidays.  These forces worked in concert to hinder total factor productivity increases.153 
 
Figure 2.   Macroeconomic figures for Iran.  Source: Oxford Economic Country 
Briefings154 
b. Price Stability   
As seen in Figure 2, inflation decreased during the Fourth Plan, mainly as 
a result of lower food prices.  These reductions are somewhat offset by currency 
depreciation and the gradual reduction of some government-provided subsidies.155  In 
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addition, consumer prices rose during the plan.156  Noteworthy is Iran’s inflation in 
comparison with the rest of the MENA region (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3.   Iranian inflation compared with that of MENA overall.  From Oxford 
Economics/World Bank157 
c. Unemployment  
Job creation has consistently plagued the Iranian economic development 
plans.  While there has been some success, in general the rate of creation has not kept 
pace with the rates of new labor in the market, and unemployment remains higher than 
desired.158  This is significant for two reasons: first, due to the government’s dominant 
role in the private sector, it alone bears almost the sole burden of creating jobs.  Second, 
through the various development plans the government has included population growth  
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control as a targeted goal.  The campaigns have been reasonably successful, yet the rates 
still remain too high with respect to the government’s ability to create expanded 
employment opportunities. 
 
Figure 4.   Unemployment rate trends in Iran.  From Index Mundi data provided by 
figures in CIA World Fact Book159  
d. Increased Investment  
Many factors have traditionally impaired growth in economic investment 
in Iran.  The significant presence of the state in the Iranian economy is one of the most 
notable.  Private investors (few that there are) are understandably wary of committing 
their finances to government corporate schemes, and entrepreneurs face significant 
obstacles to entering the market.  Data indicates that both the time required to start a 
business, as well as market capitalization of listed companies (as a percentage of GDP), 
remains anemic (see Appendix E).160 
                                                 
159 Index Mundi, “Iran Unemployment Rate” (19 February 2009) accessed 10 March 2010, 
http://www.indexmundi.com/iran/unemployment_rate.html.  
160 WTO World Development Indicators database, September 2009. 
 61
e. Reduced Dependence on Oil  
The goal of reducing dependence on oil exports as the largest source of 
national income achieved the same poor showing during the Fourth Plan as did the other 
goals.  In fact, the opposite likely occurred as the oil boom of 2008 resulted in dramatic 
rises in revenue in a remarkably short time period.  Ironically, had the government 
operated its Oil Stabilization Fund honestly and in good faith, the period could have 
provided significant resources for the government to either bolster national income when 
the price fell again, or to use on economic development and diversification projects.  By 
the end of the Fourth Development Plan, oil today accounts for almost 70% of Iran’s state 
finances and 80% of its foreign exchange earnings.161 
Thus, the Fourth Development Plan ended its tenure in a similar fashion to 
its predecessors.  While the country made some minor economic gains, the economy 
itself remained underdeveloped in terms of production and diversity, over-reliant on oil 
exports to provide currency and rents to support government social programs, and 
hindered by the over-representation of government in the private sector. 
D. RELATIVE DEVELOPMENT SUCCESSES 
One must look at the development successes achieved by Iran in some areas and 
compare these with development failures to get a sense of the overall nature of the 
Iranian development problem.  Using data between 2000 and 2008, one sees some areas 
of sustained improvement of the economy in specific areas consistent with development 
(though not necessarily of market-oriented reforms).  The first relative success is in the 
effort to curb population growth.  The overall birth rate in 2008 was at 1.3, and this was 
consistent with a steady decline throughout the period that is also shown the declines of 
total and adolescent fertility rates between 2000 and 2008 (Appendix E).  Further, the 
government apparently achieved these reductions through education and access to 
contraception rather than coercive means found elsewhere.  This signals the 
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government’s understanding of the need to control population growth rates that often 
exacerbate the efforts of economic development elsewhere in the region. 
The second area of relative success is found in the composition of the output of 
the broader economic sector.  Agriculture, as a share of the economy, decreased from 
14% of gross domestic product in 2000 to 10% of GDP in 2008 (Appendix E).  This 
decrease is in line with the increase in industry’s share of the economy, from 37% in 
2000 to 45% in 2008, and corresponds to the first broad structural change required for 
economic development—that of the relative decline of agriculture and relative increase of 
industrial output as a share of the total economy.162  Additionally, exports rose 10% from 
23% of GDP to 33% during the same period (Appendix E).  Although the indicators for 
the agricultural and industrial sectors are consistent with a developing economy (moving 
from rural-centric agricultural to urban industrial), the export numbers need to be 
interpreted carefully, as the period of increase in exports as a percentage of GDP 
coincides with a significant increase in the price of oil, the country’s main export.  
Determining whether the increase in export revenue was achieved through simple 
commodity price increase, or increased production of non-oil commodities, requires 
further research. 
Aggregate numbers of gross domestic product increases are open to interpretation 
as to whether or not they signify true economic development.  GDP grew positively 
during the period of 2000–2008 (Appendix E).  However, with the exception of 2007—in 
which the 7.8% GDP growth is less significant due the high rates of inflation during that 
time (Figure 3)—growth averaged around 5% during 2000–2008.  This is less than the 
7% the Spence Report states as the standard for high growth countries.  The combination 
in 2007 of GDP and inflation increases corresponds with a period of significant growth in 
international oil prices (Figure 1).  This weakens the argument that GDP growth on its 
own is a reliable indicator of economic development and also proves the danger of 
relying solely on GDP figures as a goal-setting mechanism for economic structural 
changes. 
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E. DEVELOPMENTAL FAILURES 
On the whole, the Iranian economy suffered more failures with regard to 
economic development than it did successes.  The first failure relates to the successes 
achieved in lowering the share of agricultural output and raising the share of industrial 
output of the broader economy.  To fully meet Perkins et al.’s requirements, the share of 
services must also increase as a factor of overall production.  In Iran, however, the share 
of services fell from 50% in 2000 to 45% in 2008 (Appendix E).  While the decline is 
small, it is consistent over time and shows little sign of trending upward as the share of 
oil production as percentage of the economy remains high. 
Many additional data points correspond to a failure of economic development.  
Gross capital formation declined slightly from 2000 to 2008, from 33% to 31% 
(Appendix E).  This relative flat line is inconsistent with the type of increase in private 
investment in the economy that the Iranian Five Year Development Plans targeted.  
Remittances increased substantially during the period as well, up from (US)$536 million 
in 2000 to (US)$1,115 million in 2008 (Appendix E).  While this period corresponds to 
an overall period of global growth and prosperity, which is likely responsible for a 
sizeable share of the increase, the scale of the increase (a near doubling) without such a 
comparable increase in the domestic economy indicates that the share of remittances of 
the overall economy rose disproportionately. 
Anemic performance is also found in the market capitalization of listed companies.  
Though there has been an increase from 2000 to 2008 (from just above 7% to slightly over 
12%), both the low percentages as well as the inconsistencies year-on-year indicate the 
failure of the Iranian government to reduce its involvement in the private sector.  Far from it, 
agencies within the government—specifically the Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) and 
their popular militia, the basij—have become more involved in the economy since the 2005 
election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President of Iran. 
The problem of inflation has remained a bane to Iranian economic planners as 
well.  After reaching egregious rates of 50% in 1995, the rate declined somewhat, but has 
remain persistently between 15% and 25% through the end of the ’90s and throughout the 
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present decade (Figure 3).  Highlighting the failure of the economic planners are the 
changes of 5% and more from year to year until the second half of this decade where it 
appears the surge in oil prices have, once again, resulted in correspondingly higher 
inflation.  Inflation climbed from 17% in 2005 to 25% in 2008, and prospects for 2009 
are not encouraging (Appendix E). Iran’s attempts to reduce the effects of commodity 
price fluctuation on the economy by reducing the share of oil have ultimately failed.     
It would seem that the failures in Iran’s structural adjustments stem from an 
improper focus solely on results and not methods.  The central economic planners 
responsible for the iterations of the Five-Year Development Plans concentrated the 
majority of their effort in setting targets for the various sectors of the economy to meet.  
While setting development goals is appropriate and required in economic planning, 
equally important is a focus on the methods—or specific regulatory, environmental, 
policy, or political changes to the structure of the economy—required to achieve those 
goals.  In addition to a lack of coherent change planning, what structural adjustments that 
were made by the economic experts had their effectiveness diluted by ideological 
interests when the proposals were put before the Majlis and Council of Guardians.  In 
these organizations (as well as the Presidency, since 2005) a political and ideological 
philosophy that puts the tenets of Khomeini’s revolutionary ideas ahead of economic 
development necessities has subordinated the potential of the five-year Plans. 
What is perhaps more damaging is that the structural reforms that were achieved 
during the first three Plans are currently being reduced by the increasingly interventionist 
role the government is taking in the economy.  Both in indirect ways such as “crony 
capitalism,”163 and in more direct methods like increasing rates of ownership by agents 
of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard of corporations in the private sector,164 the 
government is moving farther from its consistent developmental goals of reducing 
government’s role in the economy.  When the actions taken by the Iranian regime since 
2005 are examined in comparison with the Spence Report’s findings of common 
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characteristics of sustained high growth cases, specifically the crucial elements of market 
decentralization combined with effective governance (that is a government that acts “in 
the interests of all the citizens of the country—as opposed to itself or subgroups”),165 one 
can see that the Iranian economy is moving farther away from it economic development 
goals, not closer. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The people of Iran undertook the 1979 Islamic Revolution for a multitude of 
reasons as disparate as the population of Iran itself.  The emergence of Ayatollah 
Khomeini as the spiritual and intellectual figurehead of the Islamic Republic ensured that 
the generally accepted narrative both internally and externally was the theological one.   
But economic factors under the Pahlavi regime, many of them familiar issues in 
developing economies moving from rural to industrial economies (unemployment from 
rural to urban migration, increase in wealth disparity between rich and poor, and others), 
played a key role in sparking the revolution that overthrew the Shah.  The attempt to 
transform Iran into a totally Islamic Republic included serious intellectual and 
philosophical debate regarding the construction of an Islamic economic system.  This 
debate was heavily influenced from elements with left-leaning ideologies, such as 
Marxists and classically (secularly) trained economists, whose beliefs dovetailed with the 
concepts of social justice and equality held by the Islamic religious scholars, such as 
Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr and Ali Shariati.   
As a result, the method of central economic planning used under the Shah was 
kept much the same in the Islamic Republic; however, Khomeini’s ideals of Islamic 
theology legitimized the increased participatory role of the state in the economy.  Further, 
Khomeini’s interpretations allowed the state to pursue authoritarian measures by 
declaring the Imam (and thus the state) the final arbiter of how much private property is 
appropriate before it becomes a threat to social harmony.  Khomeini himself appeared at 
times to favor both a leftist view of state participation in the economy and a more laissez 
faire approach of letting private enterprise operate freely.  His political architecture 
reflected this, with the Majlis ultimately being the representative body endorsing more 
populist strategies, and the Guardian Council composed of bazaaris and more market-
oriented ulama.  The resulting political deadlock, however, could only be broken by 
Khomeini and has remained a shackle on Iran’s economic development in the decades 
since Khomeini’s death. 
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A. OIL MEANS MONEY, NOT DEVELOPMENT 
The increase in Gross Domestic Product performance, particularly in the last 
decade, reflects (almost solely) the rise in the international commodity price of oil.  As a 
result, the Iranian economy has not developed in a broad spectrum way equitable with its 
GDP increases.  In fact, Iran is now representative of a class of rentier states that fail to 
use hydrocarbon rents to generate investment and instead use it to heavily subsidize life 
for the general population to buy political quietism in the face of authoritarian 
government actions.   
This investment failure is ultimately self-defeating, as the lack of resources 
allocated to the productive sectors of the economy ultimately means that the hydrocarbon 
sector itself is negatively affected.  As it stands today, Iran’s oil and natural gas industries 
are hobbled by antiquated technology, a lack of skilled workers and engineers, and an 
inability to capitalize on available resources.  Iranian oil companies are unable to fully 
exploit available oil and gas deposits, even compared with relative performance under the 
Shah.  The Iranians, it is believed, will be unable to fully capitalize on recent discoveries 
of new fields in the Arabian Gulf as a result of decades of neglect of proper equipment 
and training.  This neglect has not only hurt the hydrocarbon extraction and production 
capabilities, but has most severely affected refinement as well.166 
As a result of a lack of proper investment, Iran today is a net importer of gasoline 
and this has direct effect on consumers and the wider economy in general.  Common 
among hydrocarbon rentier states is the belief that the oil in the ground is a “gift” that 
ought to directly benefit all the people in a country; and one of the ways this idea is 
expressed is in the belief that fuel should be considerably cheaper (after all, should not 
the people have right to the commodity first, before it is sold abroad?).  This is the case in 
Iran, where gasoline is heavily subsidized by the government, even as it actually imports 
more than it produces.  This, along with many other subsidies, is a significant burden on 
the state’s capacity to invest in other sectors of the economy.  And since, in Iran, large  
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amounts of capital almost solely reside with the state (for ideological and political 
reasons described in Chapter III), there are no other significant sources of potential large-
scale investment.   
Further exacerbating the problem is the lack of foreign investment in the Iranian 
private sector, owing to a combination of the ideological beliefs carried over from the 
Islamic revolution and external sanctions brought on by the activities of the Iranian 
government in nuclear weapons research and support of terrorist organizations.  Until the 
government can significantly reduce its outlay on subsidies—unlikely, given the current 
regime’s reliance on other populist policies—any further increases in GDP resulting from 
the rise in oil prices are likely to have little effect on the overall state of the economic 
development in Iran.167 
B. THE DELETERIOUS EFFECT OF SANCTIONS 
The current regime in Iran has imposed another severe burden on the Iranian 
economy, though not one resulting from poor economic planning or misappropriation of 
resources.  Since the government of Iran admitted in 2003 to a uranium enrichment 
program that violated its agreements under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treat (NPT), the 
United States has pursued both unilateral and multilateral sanctions in an attempt to 
coerce the Iranian government to abandon its perceived pursuit of nuclear weapons.  
These sanctions, which have increased in scope to target significant proportions of the 
overall Iranian economy, have exacerbated the negative effects of Iran’s poor 
development.  Specifically, Iran’s reliance on crude oil exports for 70% of the 
government’s budget and extensive ownership of private corporations by the IRGC 
provide easy and effective targets for international sanctions. Due to a low tax base (an 
estimated 50% of the economy is tax-exempt) and high unemployment, the government  
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is significantly dependent on the revenue from oil exports and state-owned agencies.168  
The domestic private economy lacks the capacity to support the government’s programs 
and subsidies indigenously.  
A significant example has already occurred in the wake of the most recent round 
of international sanctions.  The direct sanctions themselves, as well as pressure on 
international corporations not technically bound by the sanctions to “not fill the void” left 
by the U.S. and others, has resulted in the government of Iran paying a 25% premium 
above market price for gasoline deliveries from outside the country.169  Considering the 
high amount of gasoline imported, as well as the significant subsidies already provided to 
the public for domestic gasoline use, the impact will be significant.  As a response, the 
government has begun hoarding supplies and rationing gas sales to the public as it 
attempts to boost domestic production—a dubious undertaking considering the state of 
the infrastructure previously described.  Even if the Iranian government can, as it 
promises, replace 75% of its imported fuel,170 the cost to the government in terms of 
premiums on the remaining imported amount as well as in opportunity (and real) costs as 
resources are diverted from other economic sectors will be serious.  And this is but one 
sector of many in the economy that will likely be similarly affected. 
C. THE END OF THE REVOLUTION FOR ISLAMIC ECONOMICS IN IRAN 
Ultimately, the only certain fact of Iran’s economic future is that it is uncertain.   
While significant damage has been done in the name of populism, pragmatists and free-
market proponents still exist and vie for power within the system.  A notable fact 
following the disputed 2009 presidential elections in Iran is that some of the most 
significant opposition figures were the ones responsible for previous attempts at 
economic reform.  It is also important to understand that it is possible for an ideology that 
supports the idea of the Islamic Republic of Iran also to value the principles of a market 
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economy, private property, and economic development.  Islamic economic theory is fully 
compatible with capitalism, provided certain philosophical boundaries are adhered to.   
In the end, Iran’s economic failures following the revolution are not the result of a 
failure of Islamic economic theory.  Those ideals, ultimately, were never fully instituted.  
Instead, Ayatollah Khomeini’s version of government after the Revolution created a 
system dependent on his own personal ideology to function.  That system—of parallel 
religious and government institutions, diametrically opposed legislative bodies (neither 
with the inherent ability to overrule the other—ultimately subordinated to the rule of a 
successor lacking either the charismatic or intellectual legitimacy to stand alone meant 
that economic development was always shorted by influential populists.  This outcome is 
often found in other countries that are unable to resist the “curse” of natural resource 
endowments.  Ultimately, Iran’s poor economic showing is not the result of a failure of 
Islamic economics; instead, it is classic case of the perils of rentier economics consistent 
with many other countries whose natural resource endowments become catalysts for 
populist economic curses. 
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APPENDIX B:  ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE DURING THE 
FOURTH DEVELOPMENT PLAN 
 
Figure 5.   Economic performance during the Fourth Development Plan. From Economist 
Intelligence Unit (CIAO/EIU Partnership)172 
                                                 
172 Economist Intelligence Unit (CIAO/EIU Partnership), “Iran: Economic Structure,” (20 January 
2010) accessed 4 March 2010, 
http://www.ciaonet.org/atlas/IR/Economy/Economic_structure/20100120_33772.html. 
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APPENDIX C:  ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE DURING THE 
THIRD DEVELOPMENT PLAN 
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APPENDIX D:  MONETARY TARGETS 
Table 3.   Islamic Republic of Iran monetary targets, 1989/90–2004/5.  From IMF Country 
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2004, Accessed 2 March 2010, www.imf.org, 57. 
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APPENDIX E:  THIRD AND FOURTH DEVELOPMENT PLAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
INDICATORS 
Table 4.   Iran development indicators for Third and Fourth Development periods.  From World Trade Database, 2009175 
 2000 2005 2007 2008 
World view 
Population, total (millions) 63.94 69.09 71.02 71.96 
Population growth (annual %) 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.3 
Surface area (sq. km) (thousands) 1,745.2 1,745.2 1,745.2 1,745.2 
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population) .. .. .. .. 
GNI, Atlas method (current US$) (billions) 106.66 177.63 251.49 .. 
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) 1,670 2,570 3,540 .. 
GNI, PPP (current international $) (billions) 433.99 631.73 769.72 .. 
GNI per capita, PPP (current international $) 6,790 9,140 10,840 .. 
People 
Income share held by lowest 20% .. 6.4 .. .. 
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 69 70 71 .. 
Fertility rate, total (births per woman) 2.3 2.1 2.0 .. 
Adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15-19) 33 21 18 .. 
Contraceptive prevalence (% of women ages 15-49) 74 79 .. .. 
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total) 90 97 .. .. 
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000) 44 36 33 .. 
Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age (% of children under 5) .. .. .. .. 
Immunization, measles (% of children ages 12-23 months) 99 94 97 .. 
Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group) 90 96 105 .. 
                                                 
175 WTO World Development Indicators database, “Iran,” (September 2009) accessed 9 March 2010, www.wto.org 
 
 86
Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%) 95 105 .. .. 
Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49) 0.1 0.2 0.2 .. 
Environment 
Forest area (sq. km) (thousands) 110.8 110.8 .. .. 
Agricultural land (% of land area) 39.0 29.2 .. .. 
Renewable internal freshwater resources per capita (cubic meters) .. .. 1,809 .. 
Improved water source (% of population with access) 94 .. .. .. 
Improved sanitation facilities, urban (% of urban population with access) 86 .. .. .. 
Energy use (kg of oil equivalent per capita) 1,858 2,288 .. .. 
CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) 5.3 6.5 .. .. 
Elec.pwr consumption (kWh per capita) 1,586 2,117 .. .. 
Economy 
GDP (current US$) (billions) 101.29 192.01 286.06 385.14 
GDP growth (annual %) 5.1 4.6 7.8 5.6 
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 26.4 17.0 20.5 25.0 
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 14 10 10 10 
Industry, value added (% of GDP) 37 45 44 45 
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP) 50 45 45 45 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 23 33 32 33 
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 17 25 22 23 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 33 33 33 31 
Revenue, excluding grants (% of GDP) 23.4 36.5 37.2 38.5 
Cash surplus/deficit (% of GDP) 1.8 6.0 10.6 12.1 
States and markets 
Time required to start a business (days) .. 28 28 28 
Market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP) 7.3 20.2 15.9 12.7 
Military expenditure (% of GDP) 3.8 3.8 2.9 2.5 
Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) 2 12 42 60 
Internet users (per 100 people) 1.0 17.8 18.3 32.0 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) .. .. .. .. 
High-technology exports (% of manufactured exports) 2 3 .. .. 
 87
Global links 
Merchandise trade (% of GDP) 42.1 50.1 46.7 45.1 
Net barter terms of trade (2000 = 100) 100 139 160 .. 
External debt stocks, total (DOD, current US$) (millions) 7,978 21,260 20,577 .. 
Total debt service (% of exports of goods, services and income) 10.7 .. .. .. 
Net migration (thousands) -56 -993 .. .. 
Workers' remittances and compensation of employees, received (current US$) (millions) 536 1,032 1,115 1,115 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$) (millions) 39 918 754 .. 
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